Reparations as Redistribution by Logue, Kyle D.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2004
Reparations as Redistribution
Kyle D. Logue
University of Michigan Law School, klogue@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1738
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Law and Race Commons, Social Welfare Law
Commons, Tax Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Logue, Kyle D. "Reparations as Redistribution." B. U. L. Rev. 84, no. 5 (2004): 1319-74.
REP ARA TIO NS AS REDISTRIBUTION 
KYLE D. LOGUE0 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 3 1 9  
I. SLAVERY REPARATIONS AS CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ............................ 1 324 
A. Corrective Justice vs. Distributive Justice: The Conceptual 
Distinction . ........ . ....... . . ......... ........ . ...... . ............ .............. .. ......... 1 326 
B. Corrective Justice vs. Distributive Justice: The Functional 
Distinction ....... ... ................. . ............. . . ......... ....... ................. ..... 1 329 
C. Corrective Justice vs. Distributive Justice: From Simple 
Torts, to Toxic Torts, to Reparations .............. .. . ... ....... .... . . ........ 1 332 
D. Slavery Reparations as Corrective Justice: The Problem of 
the Passage ofTime ... ..... ................... ... .. ..... ... .. ... .... .... . ........ ..... 1 337 
E. Summary ... . ....... . . ......... .......... .... ................................ ....... ......... 1 34 1  
11. SLAVERY REPARATIONS AS DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE .......................... 1 34 1  
A. Defining Distributive Justice ..................... ................ ....... ......... 1 342 
B. Luck Egalitarianism in the Real World .. ..... ... ......... : ................. 1 346 
C. Luck Egalitarianism and Racial Inequality ............................ ... 1 348  
III. REDISTRIBUTING BY RACE ................................................................ 1 354 
A. Redistribution in the Real World: Searching for Reliable, 
Observable, Non-distorting Proxies ..... . . .................. . .. ... . .......... 1 355 
B. Race as a Redistributive Proxy: The African American Tax 
Credit (and other design alternatives) ....... .............. .................. 1 357 
C. Alternatives to Direct Cash Transfers ....... ..... ........ ............... .... 1 364 
D. Summary, Objections, and Qualifications . ......... . ........ . ............. 1 370 
CONCLUSION ................................... : ............................................................. 1 373 
INTRODUCTION 
The most controversial, and most intriguing, remedy sought by proponents 
of slavery reparations involves massive redistribution of wealth from whites to 
blacks within the United States. This is not to say that reparations proponents 
have focused only on racial redistribution. Some have called for an official 
apology from the U.S. government. 1 Others seek the creation of a foundation 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank the participants 
at the Boston University School of Law Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Slavery 
Reparations as well as my colleagues at the University of Michigan for comments on earlier 
versions of this Article. Financial support for this project was provided by the University of 
Michigan Law School's Cook Fund for summer research. 
1 143 CONG. REC. H3890-3891 (daily ed. June 1 8, 1997) (statement of Rep. Tony P. Hall 
1 3 1 9  
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or institute, funded by U.S. tax dollars, to be devoted to furthering the interests 
of African Americans, including the funding of K- 12 educational programs for 
black children and the funding of general civil rights advocacy to counteract 
the lingering effects of racism in American society.2 In a relatively new twist, 
some state governments have passed laws requiring companies to disclose the 
extent to which they or their predecessor companies were involved in or 
benefited from the practice of slavery;3 and some local governments - notably, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, and Detroit - have adopted ordinances requiring 
companies seeking to do business with the city's government to disclose any 
profits they received from slavery.4 A similar slavery "accounting" was also 
one of the remedies sought in the recent lawsuits brought by slavery 
descendants against corporations alleged to have historical ties to slaveiy.5 
Nevertheless, at the core of most slavery reparations proposals are calls for 
either cash or in-kind transfers from whites to blacks. Such redistributive 
programs will be the focus of this Article. 
Broad-based racial redistribution would, according to proponents, provide a 
measure of compensation to the present generation and perhaps to future 
generations of African Americans for the harms caused by slavery, including 
the many years of unpaid slave labor.6 Furthermore, a white-to-black 
redistributive transfer would reduce the colossal inequality of resources 
between whites and blacks in America. 7 Given the historic scope of the 
of Ohio urging support for a House Concurrent Resolution, H.R. Con. Res. 96, 1 05th Cong. 
( 1 997), containing formal congressional apology for slavery). 
2 RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 244-46 (2000) 
(suggesting the establishment of an educational trust fund and federal funding of civil rights 
litigation). 
3 See, e.g., SLAVERY ERA INS. REGISTRY, CAL. DEP'T OF INS., REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA 
LEGISLATURE (2002), at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/SEIR/SlaveinsuranceReporttoLeg.htm 
(last accessed Sept. 28, 2004) (describing recent California legislation empowering 
California insurance regulators to require insurers doing business in California to disclose 
any slavery related insurance policies and describing regulations carrying out that mission). 
4 Joyce Howard Price, Detroit Joins Two Cities on Slave Disclosures, WASH. TIMES, July 
I, 2004, at A l ,  available at 2004 WL 641601 49 (observing that companies with ties to 
slavery would not be barred from government contracts). 
5 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1 027 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(seeking an accounting of profits from slave labor to determine the proper amount on which 
to impose a constructive trust). 
6 Joe R. Feagin & Eileen O'Brien, The Long-Overdue Reparations for African 
Americans: Necessary for Societal Survival?, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 417, 4 1 8  (Roy L. 
Brooks ed., 1 999) [hereinafter WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH] (stating that white wealth has 
largely came about from stealing labor from blacks and land from native Americans). 
Consistent with the approach taken by the U.S. Census, I use the terms "black" and "African 
American" interchangeably. 
7 The average white household has, by one estimate, ten times the wealth of the average 
black household. For greater discussion of this and other inequalities, see infra notes 9 1 -
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injustice slavery represents, the potential size of a fully "reparative" transfer 
could be astronomical. Although most slavery reparations proponents decline 
to suggest specific dollar estimates of the appropriate transfer, some are willing 
to venture a guess. One researcher, for example, focusing on a stolen-labor 
measure of harm and using 1790- 1860 slave prices as proxies for the value of 
unpaid slave labor, calculated a sum of between $448 billion and $995 billion,8 
which in 2003 dollars would be approximately between $2 trillion and $4 
trillion.9 By comparison, the entire U.S. government budget in 2004 is 
projected to be just over $2 trillion. More recently, taking a different approach 
to assessing the social harm associated with slavery, sociologist Dalton Conley 
suggested that if all of the present wealth gap between African Americans and 
whites were attributed to the institution of slavery and related injustices, a one­
time transfer of 13 percent of existing white wealth would be necessary to 
eliminate the black-white wealth disparity entirely. 10 Alternatively, Conley 
suggested that a better approach might be to determine what fraction of 
existing household wealth is attributable to inheritance from prior generations, 
and to use that number to determine the extent to which current levels of black 
household wealth Jag behind those of whites because of slavery. Following 
that approach, Conley arrived at a more modest one-time tax of 3.7 percent of 
white household wealth to be distributed among African Americans.1 1 
Only the most radical reparations supporters would regard such a massive 
wealth transfer as desirable, and few people - perhaps none - would regard it 
as politically plausible. Putting aside the discussion as to amount, the idea 
itself of a transfer of resources from whites to blacks is intriguing. What 
would such a transfer even look like? Perhaps the most obvious and most 
controversial possibility would be a program of direct cash transfers to African 
American taxpayers funded by federal tax revenues or, as suggested above, by 
some special tax on whites. Indeed such a system is what many slavery 
reparations proponents seem to have in mind. That type of racially 
1 1 1  and accompanying text. 
8 Robert S. Browne, The Economic Case for Reparations to Black America, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 39, 42 ( 1972) (discussing work conducted by Jim Marketti, a University of 
Wisconsin graduate student, to determine "unpaid black equity"). 
9 Dalton Conley, Calculating Slavery Reparations: Theory, Numbers, and Implications, 
in POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES 1 1 7, 1 19 (John Torpey 
ed., 2003) (observing that Marketti's estimates matched the sum demanded by a prominent 
black separatist movement, the Republic of New Africa)). 
10 Id. at 1 22 (stating that a 1 3  percent transfer would be sufficient due to the African 
American population being approximately 1 7  percent the size of the white population). 
11 Id. at 1 22-23. To arrive at this 3.7 percent figure, Conley assumed that there were six 
(22-year) generations from the time of slavery to the present. Additionally, Conley relied on 
the assumption, developed by prominent economists Laurence Kotlikoff and Lawrence 
Summers, that 80 percent of household wealth is attributable to inheritance. Id. (citing 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in 
Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706 ( 1 981)). 
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redistributive cash transfer, however, is not the only possibility. Once we 
broaden the notion of what counts as a program of redistribution, it becomes 
clear that we already engage in some degree of racial (white-to-black) 
redistribution, some of which is controversial and some of which, apparently, 
is not. Thus, for example, affirmative-action programs can be seen as a 
prominent real-world example of an explicitly race-based in-kind transfer from 
whites (and Asian Americans) to blacks (and some other racial and ethnic 
groups, such as Native Americans). Moreover, even transfers that are not 
explicitly race-based can be understood as a form of redistribution by race. 
For example, because blacks are overrepresented in most inner-city 
metropolitan areas, any federal or state spending programs that primarily 
benefit the inner city, but that are funded by general tax revenues would have a 
racially redistributive effect. Even certain types of anti-discrimination law can 
be seen as having a racially redistributive component, insofar as it such laws 
result in racial cross-subsidization of blacks by whites. An example of this 
would be laws against racial discrimination in insurance underwriting. The 
point here is that broad-based racial redistribution, from all or almost all whites 
to all or almost all blacks, can take many forms.12 One of the lessons of this 
Article will be that all of these various program-design issues must be taken 
into account by those calling for slavery reparations in the form of white-to­
black redistribution. 
My main argument is straightforward. First, I contend that some level of 
redistribution from whites to blacks - whether paid in-cash or in-kind, whether 
explicitly race-based or only implicitly so, and whether labeled reparations or 
something else - can be defended on fairly intuitive and straightforward 
distributive justice grounds. The idea is that, according to every empirical 
study of the issue, African Americans are on average significantly less well off 
than whites. Moreover, the inequality extends to almost every conceivable 
measure of well-being - income, wealth, education, employment, health, 
housing, even life expectancy. Given this fact, and given especially this 
country's history of slavery and segregation, it is not difficult to argue that the 
government ought to spend some resources to reduce that inequality. Although 
the conclusion is not especially new, the distributive justice angle has been 
largely overlooked in discussion of slavery reparations. Second, I argue that 
any program to effect racial redistribution or reduce racial inequality - again, 
whether labeled reparations or not - should be informed by the basic lessons of 
public finance economics, a field that has long been devoted to the problem of 
designing real-world distributional programs. Drawing on that literature, I 
point out that the concept of race has three qualities that make it a surprisingly 
useful tool, at least in theory, for implementing an egalitarian vision of 
12 For a discussion of making reparations through federal welfare programs directed at 
increasing African American racial capital, see James R. Hackney, Jr., Ideological Conflict, 
African American Reparations, Tort Causation and the Case for Social Welfare 
Transformation, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1201-06 (2004). 
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distributive justice: (a) race is one of the best predictors of, or proxies for, 
overall social and economic well-being; (b) unlike redistribution with respect 
to other proxies for well-being, such as redistribution with respect to income or 
wealth, redistribution on the basis of race will not cause labor-market 
distortions, because race is relatively immutable; and (c) race is relatively 
observable. For all of these reasons, redistribution on the basis of race, at least 
in theory, has the properties of a distributively just lump-sum transfer program. 
Third, although I do not here endorse any particular racially redistributive 
program, I point out the costs and benefits of several alternative forms that 
programs of racial redistribution might, and in some cases already do, take. 
Included in that discussion are direct cash transfers from whites to blacks 
(perhaps administered through the federal tax system), which would probably 
be unconstitutional but which provides an interesting point of comparison. I 
also discuss a range of in-kind redistributive programs, from race-based 
affirmative-action programs to federal funding of urban housing and 
educational programs to certain types of anti-discrimination law, all of which 
may be constitutional, depending on their particular design details. One point 
of emphasis in the Article is that, although redistributing explicitly on the basis 
of race may have certain advantages, such as the absence of labor distortions 
that accompany income or wealth redistribution and the increased precision of 
the redistributive transfers, there are disadvantages that have to be considered 
as well, such as the difficulty of defining and policing racial categories for the 
purpose of administering a redistributive program. In addition, it may 
ultimately be that there are other proxies for well-being besides race (such as 
geography) that can be used to produce a distributively-just lump sum transfer, 
but those systems will inevitably have drawbacks as well. 
Before launching into my primary argument regarding the use of race in 
redistributive programs, I should point out that my focus on reparations as 
redistribution is a departure from the general thrust of the slavery reparations 
literature. Instead, most reparations scholars and activists view reparations as 
an issue of corrective justice, of rectifying a historic wrong.13 That vision of 
reparations, insofar as it builds on the notion of corrective justice that is 
employed in the private law context, is derived from an analogy to tort law, 
which says that if person A wrongfully harms person B, A must pay 
compensation to B. That view of slavery reparations has considerable appeal. 
Much, probably most, of the inequality between blacks and whites today, 
which I describe in some detail below, is doubtless attributable directly or 
indirectly to the historical injustices of slavery, Jim Crow, and subsequent 
discrimination. And it is certainly understandable that reparations proponents 
would seek to link racial redistribution directly with those past injustices. To 
ignore that link would itself be an injustice, as well as perhaps a tactical 
13 See Eric J. Miller, Healing the Wounds of Slavery: Can Present Legal Remedies Cure 
Past Wrongs?, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 45, 47 n.5 (2004) (discussing the corrective 
justice rationale for reparations). 
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political (and perhaps legal) error. Nevertheless, because of the amount of 
time that has elapsed since the end of slavery and the difficulty of assigning 
blame today for what happened hundreds of years ago, a program of slavery 
reparations that involved large-scale redistributive transfers from whites to 
blacks would not fit neatly within the conceptual category of corrective justice. 
Again, I am not arguing for ignoring the past. To the contrary, as will become 
clear, my distributive justice argument has an important historical component. 
Rather, my primary argument is that whether and how society ought to 
structure a slavery reparations program depends on what such a program is 
expected to achieve. The goal of slavery reparations - whether it is to achieve 
distributive justice by reducing the substantial inequalities between whites and 
blacks, or to achieve corrective justice, which requires identifying specific 
wrongdoers and assigning them blame for the harms caused by slavery - will 
have important implications for the design of the program. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the private-law roots of 
corrective justice and explains how the move from paradigmatic private-law 
setting (the simple tort or contract case) to group-based harm saps the intuitive 
strength of the corrective justice rationale. Building on this conclusion, Part I 
then points out some of the conceptual and practical difficulties with applying 
the corrective justice rationale to slavery reparations that take the form of 
broad-based transfers from whites to blacks. Next, Part II argues that some 
level of white-to-black racial redistribution can be justified on the basis of a 
modest (and fairly conservative) version of egalitarian distributive justice, 
although I make no claim as to the appropriate amount. Part III emphasizes the 
lump-sum (and therefore relatively efficient) nature of racial redistribution, 
discusses some of the alternative forms that racial redistribution might take, 
and highlights some of the costs and benefits of those alternatives. The final 
section in Part III also responds to some of the most obvious objections to the 
idea of racial redistribution of any kind. As I conclude there, it may well be 
that the expressive or political problems associated with racial redistribution -
such as the hostility that might be created among non-black citizens who 
would be required to pay the cost of the program and the expressive harms 
experienced by blacks who regard the program as demeaning - would 
outweigh the social benefits of such a program. That is an issue, I argue, for 
voters to decide. Indeed, insofar as government programs that implicitly 
engage in racial redistribution already exist, the voters have already decided. 
The question is whether more, or less, should be done. Part IV then concludes. 
I. SLAVERY REPARATIONS AS CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
As suggested in the introduction, the dominant way of speaking about 
slavery reparations is in terms of corrective justice, of repairing past wrongs. 
Scholars arguing for slavery reparations have long embraced the corrective 
justice approach.14 Likewise, plaintiffs seeking tort-like or restitutionary 
14 See, e.g. , Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, The Development of the Movement for Reparations for 
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damages in the recent federal lawsuit seeking slavery reparations have invoked 
the corrective justice principle and the idea of righting past wrongs.15 The 
dominance of the corrective justice framework is not surprising. There is a 
good case to be made that African Americans living today, even after all this 
time, continue to suffer disadvantages due to slavery and its aftermath.16 
Moreover, previous reparations programs, such as the program of German 
reparations paid to Holocaust survivors and the payments from the U.S. 
government to the victims of the Japanese American internment camps, have 
been defended on corrective-justice grounds. In those cases the analogy to the 
slavery case has been difficult to resist.17 Some commentators have gone so 
far as to assert that the concept of reparations itself, as a definitional matter, 
entails the "backward-looking grounds of corrective justice."18 All of this 
being said, and despite the obvious appeal of corrective justice to reparations 
generally, I want to emphasize the limitations of the corrective-justice 
approach when applied to slavery reparations in particular, at least those 
reparations proposals that involve broad-based racial redistribution from all 
white taxpayers to all black taxpayers. My claim is that the corrective-justice 
intuition grows steadily weaker as we move away from paradigmatic private­
law setting. Further, I argue that the corrective justice rationale, when applied 
to slavery reparations in particular, loses much of its normative punch, and 
some version of distributive justice becomes the more compelling rationale for 
racially redistributive transfers. 
African Descendants, 3 J.L. Soc'Y 1 33 ,  1 33-34 (2002) (stating "[t]he demand for 
reparations . . .  is a demand for acknowledgment and repair of the vestiges of slavery"); Kim 
Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action 
and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 685 (2004) (pointing out society's obligation to 
make amends for its participation in wrongful discrimination); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 279, 284 (2003) ("One of the primary tenets of the reparations debate should be 
focused, in my view, on repairing the harm that has been most severe and correcting the 
history of racial discrimination in America where it has left its most telling evidence"). 
15 See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 
No. 02-CV-1 862 (E.D.N. Y. filed March 26, 2002) (outlining wrongs committed against 
slaves and seeking restitution and disgorgement of profits from slavery). 
16 I define the aftermath of slavery to include at least the 1 00 years of legal segregation 
that followed the Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
17 Additionally, it may be helpful to consider analogizing reparations to products liability 
or toxic torts. See infra text accompanying notes 45-51 (discussing corrective and 
distributive justice in the context of product liability cases and toxic torts). 
18 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical 
Injustices, 1 03 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 691 (2003) (defining the term "reparations"); see also 
JANNA THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATION AND HISTORICAL 
INJUSTICE 1 03 (2002) ("It is a principle basic to reparative, as well as retributive, justice that 
obligations and entitlements associated with wrongdoing belong only to those who have 
done or suffered the wrong."). 
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A. Corrective Justice vs. Distributive Justice: The Conceptual Distinction 
Corrective justice has been defined as the principle that wrongfully caused 
harms ought to be repaired.19 Thus, when A wrongfully harms B or B's 
property, tort law requires A to provide some form of compensation. This 
outcome is consistent with and justified by the standard account of corrective 
justice, or so the argument goes.20 The least controversial application of the 
corrective justice idea would be rectifying intentionally caused harms. If A 
intentionally injures B, no one would deny the strength of B's claim to 
recovery.21 Most scholars, however, would also extend the concept of 
corrective justice to encompass negligently caused harms as well. Some even 
go so far as to argue that corrective justice supports strict liability with respect 
to certain classes of accidents, for example, in situations involving inherently 
risky activities.22 Tort law is not the only legal area to which corrective justice 
principles can be applied. There are corrective justice elements in property 
law, contract law, and the law of unjust enrichment (sometimes called 
restitution law).23 Thus, if A steals property from B (or breaches a contract 
with B), A has incurred an obligation to make B whole.24 In sum, corrective 
justice describes and explains the core ideas of not only tort law but much of 
private law generally. 
19 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1 995) ("[C]orrective justice is the principle that those 
who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the 
core of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice."); see also Gary T. Schwartz, 
Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Af irming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 80 1 ,  1 80 1  ( 1997) ("Currently there are two major camps of tort scholars. One 
understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the goal of deterrence, commonly 
explained within the framework of economics. The other looks at tort law as a way of 
achieving corrective justice between the parties."). Aristotle is credited with originating 
corrective j ustice and distributive justice as conceptual categories. See ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1 20-23 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1 962). 
20 See Coleman, supra note 1 9, at 53. 
21 Most would also agree that this obligation exists irrespective of the effect of such a 
rule on incentives or risk bearing or other instrumental concerns. 
22 See e.g., Ronald R. Ratton, Corrective Justice and the D.C. Assault Weapon Liability 
Act, 1 9  J. LEGIS. 287, 305-06 ( 1 993) (using corrective justice to justify strict liability for 
manufacturers, dealers, and importers of assault weapons). 
23 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 ,  (2000) (discussing corrective justice in the context of property 
and contract law and arguing that restitution should be gain-based, in that it should focus on 
why a particular plaintiff should gain as a opposed to why a particular defendant should 
disgorge wrongfully acquired property). 
24 Breaking a contractual promise can also be seen as wrongfully causing a harm. See 
Edward Lorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 365, 1409 ( 1982) (discussing the use of specific performance and cost of completion 
damages to enforce the view that willfully breaking a contractual promise is wrong). 
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It should come as no surprise, however, that corrective justice, like any 
normative or descriptive legal theory, has certain shortcomings. The primary 
shortcoming of corrective justice as an account of tort law, or of private law 
more generally, is its failure to specify an independent conception of 
"wrongfulness."25 This is a serious deficiency of the theory, as even its 
proponents seem to understand. 26 If we do not know what counts as a 
wrongful act, how can we know whether compensation should be paid? By 
contrast, consider the leading alternative theory (some would say the dominant 
theory) of private law: the economic approach. Although the economic theory 
of, for example, tort law has its own shortcomings (such as sometimes 
implausible assumptions about the rationality of individual actors in certain 
settings), it does provide reasonably well specified explanations or predictions 
of the circumstances in which liability ought to attach and why. Under the 
economic approach, the basic idea is that society should adopt the rule that 
creates the optimal - cost-minimizing - accident-prevention incentives among 
both potential injurers and potential victims.27 Thus, if the corrective justice 
theorist defined "wrongful" as "inefficient," the two theories would be 
coextensive, or virtually so, a fact that is distressing to corrective justice 
theorists.28 This overlap, however, should come as no surprise really, because 
both theories were developed as efforts to describe, or to provide coherent 
accounts of, the same set of existing common law doctrines. Moreover, the 
pursuit of efficiency is a compelling normative vision of what private law 
ought to be about, even if the efficiency explanation is implausible as a 
descriptive matter in certain settings. All of this is not to say, however, that the 
two theories - corrective justice and efficiency - cannot and do not diverge at 
times. Given that the economic approach is dependent on the incentive effects 
of law and the corrective justice approach is not, it is certainly possible to 
imagine circumstances in which corrective justice would call for compensation 
but economic analysis would not. Indeed, as we shall see below, certain 
reparations settings will provide an interesting example of just this sort of 
divergence. 
25 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 93-94 
("[C]orrective justice is incomplete in that one must look elsewhere for a substantive theory 
of what counts as wrongful injury, a point that most scholars state explicitly or acknowledge 
implicitly.") (citations omitted). 
26 See id. at 93-97 (acknowledging that the lack of a substantive notion of wrongfulness 
obscures the criteria which should be used to determine if a rule promotes fairness in a 
certain case). 
27 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. 
L.J. 1447, 1463-65 (1991) (observing that economic treatment of common law issues 
focuses on incentives rather than status to determine the new "price" of certain types of 
individual behavior). 
28 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 low A L. 
REV. 427, 431 ("One problem with imposing corrective injustices in order to annul greater 
wrongful losses is that it threatens to tum corrective justice into a form of efficiency."). 
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A key aspect of the philosophical literature on corrective justice is the effort 
to distinguish corrective justice from distributive justice. This distinction will 
prove to be important for the slavery reparations question, although I will 
argue that the distinction is less about philosophy and more about function. 
Corrective justice as a philosophical idea is, again, about restoring the status 
quo, requiring A to compensate B for some wrong that was done by the former 
to the latter. By contrast, distributive justice is about the fairness of the overall 
distribution of scarce societal benefits and burdens within a society and 
typically calls for reducing certain types of societal inequality.29 What is 
interesting is that both corrective and distributive justice can be understood as 
applying irrespective of, or oblivious to, the other. On this view, corrective 
justice requires that the wrongdoer compensate the victim regardless of 
whether the initial allocation of resources as between the wrongdoer and victim 
- the status quo that corrective justice seeks to restore - was just. Likewise, 
distributive justice, which imposes obligations on all members within a 
community to share societal resources and burdens fairly, seems, according to 
the prevailing philosophical view, to be blind to any special obligations that 
have been created by wrongs committed by one individual against another 
individual. 30 
To make this distinction clear (perhaps painfully so), consider a stylized 
example. Imagine a society composed entirely of four individuals (A, B, C, 
and D), each of whom has exactly $ 1000. Assume further that this initial 
allocation of wealth is considered fair or distributively just; in other words, the 
principle of distributive justice in this society is strict equality of wealth. Now 
suppose that A steals $ 1000 from B, leaving B with nothing, A with $2000, 
and C and D with $ 1000 each. On these facts, both corrective and distributive 
justice would call for A to return the stolen $ 1000 to B. Such a transfer would 
not only redress the wrongfully caused harm, it would also achieve what is by 
assumption the distributively-just outcome. Distributive justice and corrective 
justice diverge, however, when there is an unequal or otherwise distributively 
unjust initial allocation of resources. To see this point, imagine now that A 
starts with $0, and B, C, and D start with $ 1333.33 each. Thus, society's 
$4000 of wealth in this example is unevenly, and therefore under my 
assumptions unjustly, distributed. If we assume now that A steals $200 from 
B, so that after the theft A has $200, B has $ 1 133.33, and C and D have 
$ 1333.33 each, the interesting question is whether corrective justice still 
requires A to return the stolen money to B, even though doing so would 
reestablish the initial unjust allocation of resources. 
The answer seems to be yes. Most contemporary legal philosophers seem to 
believe that corrective justice requires restoring the status quo regardless of the 
effect on the overall distribution of resources. 31 The reason, the argument 
29 For a more precise definition of"distributive justice, see infra Part II.A. 
30 See infra Part II.A. 
31 See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive 
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goes, is that corrective justice is the obligation that attaches to particular 
individuals with respect to a given transaction or interaction and thus is distinct 
from distributive justice.32 Distributive justice, again, is indifferent to these 
sorts of personal, transactional obligations.33 With distributive justice, the 
responsibility to correct the inequality in society rests with everyone in the 
society. Consider now how this dichotomous distinction between corrective 
and distributive justice would apply to my example. Assuming again, for 
simplicity, that distributive justice calls for strict equality of wealth and that B, 
C, and D have equal initial allocations of wealth ($ 1333.33), and that A's 
initial allocation is $0, distributive justice (as defined here) would require B, C, 
and D to pay $333.33 to A, and this obligation would exist irrespective of any 
obligation that B, C, or D might have with respect to A (or A to them) under 
corrective justice.34 
In sum, corrective justice is about private obligations between individuals, 
and distributive justice is about how scarce resources, opportunities, as well as 
burdens should be allocated within a society among all of its members. 
B. Corrective Justice vs. Distributive Justice: The Functional Distinction 
Not only have philosophers taken pains to draw the distinction between 
corrective justice and distributive justice, they locate the two notions of justice 
in separate and distinct areas of the law. That is, legal philosophers talk about 
corrective justice as being primarily the role of private law - the domain of 
torts, contracts, and property; whereas distributive justice is assumed to be 
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 5 15, 515-16 (1992). Benson noted that: 
Id. 
Over the centuries, writers have proposed different conceptions of corrective and 
distributive justice. Thus, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas understood them in one way, 
Hobbes and Grotius in another, and Kant and Hegel in still another. And the same is 
true of contemporary legal and political theory. Despite such differences, however, 
corrective justice has usually been thought of as comprising those principles that 
directly govern private transactions between individuals. In developed legal systems, 
these principles are generally embodied in the law of contract, torts, and unjust 
enrichment. By contrast, the concept of distributive justice has been viewed as 
including those principles that ought to regulate the fair distribution of common 
burdens and benefits among individuals or groups of individuals. A system of income 
taxation is an example of a scheme coming under distributive justice. 
32 See id. at 538. 
33 See id. 
34 Note that in the example in which A has stolen $200, leaving B with $1133.33, the 
corrective justice and distributive justice goals might be coordinated so that A would be 
allowed to keep the $200, and B's  redistributive obligation would be reduced to $133.33. 
That is, the theoretical separation of corrective justice and distributive justice does not 
necessarily require that A actually handover a check for $200 (or the actual $200 that was 
stolen), and then B write another check for $333.33. The point is that the two obligations 
are separate and distinct. The reason for this distinction is not so much theoretical as 
practical. 
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relegated to the redistributive arm of the government, specifically, the tax-and­
transfer system.35 It is interesting, and in my view not coincidental, that a 
similar division of labor has been suggested by legal economists. That is, legal 
economists also argue that the primary functions of private law and tax law are 
distinct from each other. However, instead of drawing a distinction between 
corrective justice and distributive justice, which are philosophical terms, legal 
economists distinguish between the efficiency and redistributive functions of 
law. Thus, the conventional wisdom among economic analysts of law is that 
"legal rules," by which they typically mean private law rules, should be 
designed exclusively to achieve efficiency and that any redistribution that 
society chooses to do should be accomplished exclusively through the tax-and­
transfer system.36 In other words, the private-law legal system helps to 
maximize the size of the pie, and the tax-and-transfer system is the means for 
slicing the pie fairly.37 
Again, both philosophers and legal economists seem to be persuaded by this 
division of functions, but it is the legal economists who provide a 
comprehensive defense of it, in an argument based on comparative advantage. 
Legal rules, the arguments goes, are especially well suited for promoting 
efficiency, because legal rules can, if properly designed, create optimal 
(welfare-maximizing) incentives on the part of private actors.38 The efficiency 
accounts of tort, contract, and property rules are by now well known, and there 
is no need to rehearse them here. 39 But the next step in the argument is key: 
Legal rules are poorly suited to achieve society's redistributive aims, at least 
insofar as the redistributive goal is shifting resources from the rich to the poor. 
A number of justifications are given for this conclusion. The strongest 
arguments are what might be called the "haphazardness" argument and the 
35 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 274-80 ( 197 1 )  (conceptualizing 
government as four braches, each concerned with preserving social and economic 
conditions); see also Benson, supra note 3 1 ,  at 5 1 5- 1 6. 
36 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 24-27 
(2d ed. 1 989) (stating that the goal ofredistribution may cause socially inefficient legal rules 
to be accepted); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient 
Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 ( 1 994) 
("[R]edistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the 
income tax system and typically is less efficient."). As will become clear, however, this 
distinction between private law and tax or distributional law becomes blurred in certain 
settings, making the analysis much more complicated. 
37 Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, 
and Insurance 56 TAX L. REv. 1 57, 1 58 (2003) (baldly asserting that the majority of legal 
economists likely hold the view that the tax system should be the exclusive policy tool for 
redistributing income). 
38 See Stake, supra note 27, at 1463-65. 
39 For an introduction to the issue of whether common law rules are directed toward 
justice or efficiency, see Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.  REV. 
485 ( 1 980). 
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"contracting around" argument. The haphazardness argument is that legal 
rules in general provide both an insufficiently comprehensive and an 
insufficiently precise system of distributive justice.40 They are insufficiently 
comprehensive in the sense that only a small percentage of individuals in 
society come into direct contact with the legal system; whereas, a much larger 
percentage of individuals within society can be brought within the scope of the 
tax system.41 And redistributive legal rules can be insufficiently precise 
insofar as courts are not set up to measure relative well-being - such as relative 
income or wealth - as between plaintiffs and defendants; whereas, that is 
precisely what the taxing authority is set. up to do.42 The lesson of the 
contracting-around argument is this: In legal settings that involve contractual 
relationships between plaintiffs and defendants (what might be called "vertical 
contractual relationships"), it will be almost impossible to redistribute from a 
class of defendants (say, "rich" product manufacturers) to a class of plaintiffs 
(say, "poor" product consumers), because future parties to such contractual 
relationships (i.e., future manufacturers and consumers) will simply contract 
around any such effort at redistribution.43 Thus, in the case of a products 
liability rule designed to redistribute wealth from product manufacturers to 
product consumers, the rule would not necessarily work, as manufacturers 
would pass some of the cost of the redistributive rule back to the consumers 
themselves through increased prices. Moreover, if some of the cost is borne by 
corporate shareholders, there is no reason to believe that shareholders as a class 
are better or less well off on average than product consumers - especially in 
today's era of widely owned stock mutual funds. 
That legal philosophers seem to endorse a similar division of functions 
between legal rules and tax rules should come as no revelation. I have already 
noted the potentially derivative (and certainly overlapping) relationship 
between corrective justice and efficiency explanations of private law rules. 
Thus, insofar as corrective justice is another term for efficient deterrence, it 
only makes sense that both theories would suggest a similar role for the legal 
and tax systems. As already noted, however, corrective justice and efficiency 
are not necessarily co-extensive. Nevertheless, the functional distinction 
between private law and tax law seems to make sense even in the non­
overlapping situations - such as situations in which corrective justice, but not 
deterrence, would call for a remedy. For example, if A intentionally takes B's 
property, and there is no plausible argument that the legal rule in this setting 
will have an appreciable incentive (or efficiency) effect on future "A's", not 
only would corrective justice still call for A to compensate B but that 
corrective justice function would most likely best be achieved through the 
40 Logue & Avraham, supra note 37, at 177-88 (summarizing and critiquing the 
contracting-around and haphazardness arguments). 
41 See id. at 185-88. 
42 See id. at 182-85. 
43 See id. at 177-82. 
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implementation of a legal rule, which would involve a court and maybe a jury 
and all the other aspects of due process, such that a full factual hearing on the 
question of A's and B's rights to the property in question can be addressed. 
The tax system, by contrast, would not provide a suitable system of redress for 
such wrongs.44 Where the issue becomes trickier for both the philosophers and 
the economists, and where the division of functions becomes less clear, is 
when the boundaries between private law and redistributive or tax law become 
blurred, which is precisely what has happened in the slavery reparations 
debate. 
C. Corrective Justice vs. Distributive Justice: From Simple Torts, to Toxic 
Torts, to Reparations 
Before we discuss reparations, however, let us consider the intermediate 
cases of products liability law and toxic torts, the analysis of which can 
provide useful insights into not only whether a program of slavery reparations 
makes sense, but, if so, how it ought to be designed. Recall the primary 
distinction between corrective and distributive justice: Corrective justice, at its 
core, is about private obligations between individuals created by one party's 
wrongfully harming another and is generally considered the domain of private 
law. Distributive justice, by contrast, is about the broader social obligations 
that members of a society have to one another - with an emphasis on reducing 
arbitrary inequality, and is considered the domain of the tax-and-transfer 
system.45 As we shall see, however, reparations programs do not fit neatly into 
44 Interestingly, this distinction between the relevant domains of private law and 
redistributive law can be traced at least as far back as the Old Testament. According to 
Mosaic Law, corrective justice was embodied in the talion principle - eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth. Exodus 21:24 (New Revised Standard Version). Those given the responsibility of 
administering corrective justice were admonished not to ignore considerations of 
distributive justice. Exodus 23:3 (New Revised Standard Version) ("[N]or shall you be 
partial to the poor in a lawsuit."). There was also a separate system of distributive justice, 
whereby wealthy Jews were commanded to lend without interest to the poor. Deuteronomy 
15:7-9 (New Revised Standard Version) ("If there is among you anyone in need . . .  do not 
be hard-hearted or tight-fisted toward your needy neighbor . . .  rather open your hand, 
willingly lending enough to meet the need, whatever it may be."); Exodus 22:25 (New 
Revised Standard Version) ("If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you 
shall not deal with them as a creditor; you shall not exact interest from them"). Moreover, 
property owners were expected to abide by the Sabbatical year, which meant every seventh 
year leaving their land fallow for the use of the poor. Exodus 23:10-11 (New Revised 
Standard Version) ("For six years you shall sow your land and gather its yield; but the 
seventh year you shall let it rest and lie fallow, so that the poor of your people may eat; and 
what they leave the wild animals may eat."). In sum, some functional division between 
corrective and distributive justice and the systems that implement them seems to have 
existed for thousands of years. (I am grateful to Bill Miller for pointing out these particular 
passages from the Bible and their relevance to my argument.) 
45 I provide a fuller definition of distributive justice later in the Article. See infra Part 
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these categories and, depending on the design and the purpose of the particular 
program, might be considered either more about corrective justice or more 
about distributive justice or somewhere in between. 
However, let us first consider an intermediate type of program, one that is 
one step beyond the individual tort case (involving Person A and Person B) 
and one step closer to the reparations context: namely, a typical products 
liability lawsuit. Remember that under a corrective justice rationale, when 
Person A takes Person B's property, our intuition tells us that the law ought to 
compel B to return the property or pay damages, irrespective of whether such a 
rule provides a deterrent benefit to future A's. Now, to focus the analysis on 
the corrective justice intuition (and to minimize the work being done by the 
deterrence idea), assume that products liability law has no deterrent effect 
whatsoever on corporate decision making - that corporate management, for 
example, wrongly and irrationally regard the probably of tort liability as being 
zero no matter what the law actually is.46 Assume also that adopting a rule of 
enterprise liability would result in the costs of product-related injuries being 
shifted from the injured consumers (and their first-party health insurers) to a 
combination of: (a) the customers of the corporation (through product price 
increases); (b) the corporation's liability insurers (through risk-shifting 
policies); (c) the shareholders of the manufacturing corporation (as not all of 
the liability would be shifted to consumers through price-increases or to 
insurers through liability coverage); and (d) the company's employees, 
including their management whose compensation and employment status 
would be affected by liability outcomes. Now the question is whether in such 
an example there is a normative (and, by assumption, non-deterrence) 
argument for holding the manufacturer liable and thus shifting the costs of the 
product injuries from the victims to the corporation. If so, the next question is 
whether that argument is one of corrective or distributive justice - and, of 
course, whether the distinction matters. 
In my view, there is a normative argument, or at least a generally shared 
intuition, that supports compelling the corporation to pay damages in this 
hypothetical, though this intuition is significantly weakened by the assumed 
absence of any deterrence benefit from such a rule. The justification for 
corporate liability in this example is somewhat more attenuated than the case 
involving individuals A and B above, since a corporation is not really a 
separate person, even though the law treats it as one. Instead, as the 
assumptions above suggest, the corporation is merely a contractual stand-in for 
various stakeholders, such as stockholders, employees, managers, even 
insurers, most of whom, at least in the case of large public corporations, do not 
participate directly in product design, manufacturing, or marketing decisions. 
II.A. 
46 Although this is an especially difficult assumption for me, being a believer in the 
deterrent value of products liability law, it is not implausible and it helps to make the point 
that corrective justice can be independent of efficiency. 
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Nevertheless, whether the brunt of corporate liability falls on shareholders or 
managers or liability insurers, there is something intuitive about the idea that 
the corporation and its stakeholders ought collectively to bear the burden of the 
haims that the corporation's product wrongfully causes. And that intuition 
applies, I think, irrespective of whether those stakeholders are rich or poor, 
which is why it seems fair to characterize this intuition as one of corrective 
justice rather than distributive justice. 
But the reason it makes sense to call this hypothetical an example of 
corrective justice is purely functional, in the following sense: The question of 
the relative income or wealth of the corporation's shareholders as compared 
with their customers is an issue best handled through the tax-and-transfer 
system, given that the tax-and-transfer system is relatively comprehensive 
(transfers can be made from all of the rich to all of the poor) and because that 
system avoids the contracting-around problem described above. Thus, it 
generally makes sense as a functional matter, in the design of products liability 
law (and tort law more generally), to ignore the relative income or wealth of 
the parties involved. And that is why products liability law (as with tort law 
generally) is best understood as a system of corrective justice - or, under more 
realistic assumptions, a system of deterrence and corrective justice. If that 
were not the case, if we thought that using a product liability rule could be a 
relatively efficient way of redistributing from, say, rich product manufacturers 
to poor product consumers,47 then the normative intuition favoring liability in 
this example might fairly be called one of distributive justice. 
Now consider a more extreme case, one that is yet another step closer to the 
reparations context and that blurs further the distinction between corrective and 
distributive justice - the example of a toxic tort, which raises not only issues of 
group-based wrongs but also issues of the passage of time. Although there is 
no single universally accepted definition of what constitutes a toxic tort, most 
of the paradigmatic toxic tort cases have the following characteristics: (a) a 
corporate defendant (or class of defendants) that manufactures a product with 
certain toxic or harmful qualities; (b) numerous individuals who claim to have 
been exposed to the defendant's product and who claim to have suffered some 
injury or illness as a result; and (c) a long (multi-year) latency period between 
the victims' exposure to the product and the physical manifestation of their 
harm.48 To isolate the corrective justice intuition, let us continue to assume 
that tort law has no deterrence value. In toxic tort cases, even under these 
assumptions, the corrective justice argument for imposing corporate liability 
could be quite strong. This would be true, for example, in a situation in which: 
(a) the causal link between the defendant 's product and the victims' injuries is 
47 And, again, the conventional wisdom among legal economists now is that this 
argument is fallacious. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 37, at 1 58. 
48 See, e.g. , Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 1 35 (2003) (involving a claim by 
six former railway employees against their employer railroad company involving fear of 
contracting cancer due to exposure to asbestos). 
2004] REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: KYLE D. LOGUE 1335 
clear; and (b) it can be proven the defendant knew or should have known of the 
risk of injury at the time of the exposure. If there is a failure of proof, 
however, with respect to any of these elements, the corrective justice case for 
liability can fail as well. And the more time that passes between the exposure 
to the product and the manifestation of the injury, the more difficult it becomes 
to make the requisite demonstrations of proof. 
Perhaps the best way to understand the effect of time on tort liability - and 
this is especially relevant to the slavery reparations question - is the fact that 
tort law generally does not allow intergenerational claims for liability. In other 
words, tort law simply does not impute a "duty" that extends to subsequent 
generations, at least not to individuals who have not at least been conceived at 
the time of the incident that gave rise to the harm. Thus, there are cases in 
which individuals have been allowed to recover for harm caused to them while 
they were in their mother's womb - harm caused, for example, by some drug 
that their mothers took while pregnant with them. 49 And even a few 
jurisdictions have allowed claims where the injury to the baby was the result of 
harm to the mother's body that occurred before the baby was conceived. 50 But 
such cases are exceedingly rare, and, moreover, courts have never gone the 
next step to allow an individual (or a class of individuals) to recover for 
damages that have incurred as a result of harm caused to their grandparents -
and certainly not to their great grandparents. The argument that courts give 
when they deny liability in these cases is simply that the concept of 
foreseeability does not extend generally beyond human beings who have been 
born, or at least conceived, at the time of the tortious act.51 
The extension of corrective justice from individual wrongs to corporate 
wrongdoing can be pushed yet further to include wrongs committed by one 
country against another, or by a country against a particular group of people. 
This is the step that brings us to reparations. It is also a step, however, that 
further attenuates the corrective-justice intuition at least as a functional matter, 
or so I argue.52 In addition, the corrective justice rationale is further weakened 
49 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 367-68 (5th ed. 
1 984). 
50 Id. at 369 n.26; see also Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 
64 TENN. L. REv. 3 1 5, 320-27 ( 1 997) (describing cases that have allowed recovery for 
preconception torts). 
· 
5 1 A classic case is Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 591  N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1 992), which 
involved a diethylstilbestrol ("DES") claim brought on behalf of a child who had allegedly 
sustained injuries as a result of damage to his mother' s  reproductive system, which damage 
had happened to the mother when she was in the womb of her mother - the plaintiffs  
grandmother. In a split decision, the court held for  the defendant, invoking Palsgraf v .  Long 
Island R.R. Co. , 1 62 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1 928), and arguing that the harm was not foreseeable. 
The majority concluded that "[w]hen a pharmaceutical company prescribes drugs to a 
woman, the company, under ordinary circumstances, does not have a duty to her daughter's 
infant who will be conceived twenty-eight years later." Id. at 762. 
52 Moreover, if we reintroduce the deterrence or efficiency component of private law, it 
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as the time-element becomes larger, that is, as time passes between the initial 
injury and the eventual claim for repair. As a descriptive matter, there have 
been a number of reparations regimes established in the past that were justified 
on corrective justice grounds. The two examples that are most often cited, at 
least in the slavery reparations literature, are: (a) the payments made by the 
West German government (starting in the 1950s and continuing for decades) to 
Israel and to various Jewish charitable organizations for the benefit of 
Holocaust survivors; and (b) the U.S. government's 1988 payments to the 
Japanese Americans who had been held in internment camps during World 
War II. In both cases a plausible corrective justice story can be told for some 
type of reparations payments. Whether a pure distributive justice story can be 
told, however, seems less likely. 
In both the Holocaust survivor and Japanese American reparations 
programs, for example, the payer governments, or individuals acting under the 
auspices of those governments, had perpetrated injustices against - wrongfully 
harmed - a group of identifiable individuals, and, critically, the reparations 
payments went to those victims - not to their heirs or descendants. In the 
German case, the payees were the actual victims of the Holocaust, including 
former forced laborers, concentration-camp internees, and individuals deprived 
of rights or property under the Nazi regime.53 Likewise, in the Japanese 
American case, the payees were the particular individuals who had been 
required to sell their belongings, leave their homes, and move to what 
amounted to concentration camps. 54 In neither case, therefore, were payments 
generally made to heirs or descendants of the original victims - only to the 
victims themselves. 55 Hence, the analogy to corporate tort liability or to a 
is even clearer that slavery reparations are best understood as an example of pure 
redistribution. That is, no one can claim that requiring the payment of slavery reparations 
today would have any sort of deterrent effect. It is not even clear who would conceivably be 
the target of such a deterrence message. 
53 U.S. Dep't of State, German Compensation for National Socialist Crimes (March 6, 
1 996), at http://www.ushmm.org/assets/frg.htm (last accessed Sept. 28, 2004). Under the 
German reparations program, much of the money was paid to an organization called the 
"Jewish Claims Conference," an association of Jewish charitable organizations that was 
given the task of paying out the funds to holocaust survivors. Id. Eligibility for funds is 
limited to actual victims of the holocaust, including former forced laborers and 
concentration camp internees, as well as individuals deprived of rights or property under the 
Nazis. See generally Claims Conference, The Conference on Jewish Material Claims 
Against Germany, at www.claimscon.org (last accessed Sept. 28, 2004) (providing the 
official web site of the Jewish Claims Conference). 
54 Sandra Taylor, The Internment of Americans of Japanese Ancestry, in WHEN SORRY 
ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 165-68 (describing the experience of the Japanese American 
internees). 
55 In the case of the Japanese American reparations, payments of $20,000 were made 
only to the then-living actual victims of the internment camps, of which there were 
approximately 60,000. See Roger Daniels, Redress Achieved, 1983-1990, in WHEN SORRY 
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toxic tort situation is straightforward, although neither reparations program 
involved the court system.56 What is also interesting is that neither reparations 
program seemed to tum on a claim that the putative beneficiaries were poorer 
on average than those who were funding the programs. That is, the programs 
were not primarily justified, if at all, on distributive justice grounds. Although 
it seems likely that West German taxpayers, who funded the original 
Holocaust-survivor reparations program, were on average richer than the 
average recipient of reparations payments in the years following the war, that 
may not have been the case and, in any event, a needs-based assessment 
apparently was not a requirement of the transfers. In other words, if it had 
been the case that the designated beneficiaries, as a class, were on average at 
the same or higher level of income and wealth as those paying into the system, 
it seems unlikely that the program would have therefore been stopped. 
Corrective justice would still have required some reparative transfer from the 
Germans to the Jews. And a similar conclusion could perhaps be drawn about 
the internment-reparations program as well. 
What does all of this have to do with slavery reparations? The question is 
whether the same sort of corrective justice story, which applies in some tort 
contexts and which seems to have applied in some previous reparations 
contexts, would also apply to a program of slavery reparations. I now tum to 
that question. 
D. Slavery Reparations as Corrective Justice: The Problem of the Passage of 
Time 
Although there is obvious rhetorical force in grounding a slavery reparations 
program in the idea of corrective justice, there are also serious drawbacks to 
that approach, all of which have been noted previously by numerous 
commentators and which I only summarize here.57 An initial obvious 
IsN'T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 1 89. 
56 In more recent years, lawsuits have been used to recover additional reparations-like 
recoveries for some victims of injustice that occurred during the reign of the Third Reich. 
See generally Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in 
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (2000) (discussing the recent holocaust-related 
suits in considerable detail). 
57 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 1 8  (focusing on intergenerational duties owed 
between social groups); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Slavery 
Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2003) (discussing technical difficulties 
involved in creating a reparations system); Gregory Kane, Why the Reparations Movement 
Should Fail, 3 MARGINS 1 89 (2003); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1 8; Jeremy Waldron, 
Superceding Historic Injustice, 1 03 ETHICS 4 ( 1992) (discussing how the passage of time 
may cause reparations, and the concomitant social upheaval which they may produce, to be 
superceded by other social needs). The best collection of responses that I have encountered 
to these objections to slavery reparations is found in Kim Forde-Mazrui's excellent article 
on the subject. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 1 4  (providing a comprehensive articulation of 
the corrective justice case for slavery reparations and a defense against the leading 
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argument is that assigning blame for American slavery to any currently living 
person is problematic, maybe impossible. The actual human perpetrators of 
slavery have been dead for over a hundred years. Thus, if culpability were to 
be ascribed to anyone still in existence, it would have to be to an institution, 
and a long-lived one at that, such as a corporation or a government entity. For 
example, slavery reparations proponents sometimes argue for assigning some 
of the responsibility for slavery to the U.S. government, since slavery was, 
prior to the Civil War and the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, entirely 
consistent with U.S. law. 
This argument for U.S.-funded reparations, however, is famously flawed. 
For one thing, it fails to account for the U.S. government's role in ending 
slavery and the enormous price paid - in terms of resources and lives - to bring 
the institution of slavery to an end. In the case of the Holocaust-survivor 
reparations program, by contrast, although the German government voluntarily 
began making payments in the 1950s, a force outside of the German 
government - namely, the Allies - had to intervene to end the holocaust. Thus, 
the price the German government paid in terms of lives and resources prior to 
the end of the war was incurred in an effort to continue rather than to end the 
injustice. Moreover, so much time has passed since the Civil War and so many 
changes have taken place, it is difficult to conceive of the current U.S. 
government as being the same as the pre-Civil-War version of the same 
government. Although it is not a decisive argument that none of the 
participants in the current federal government (and no currently living 
taxpayers for that matter) are in any sense to blame for slavery,58 it is still 
relevant. Whenever a country is asked to pay reparations out of current tax 
dollars for a harm caused many years in the past, even if payments are made 
only to living victims, there is some degree of slippage between the payees and 
the wrongdoers. In this respect, of course, there is a significant difference 
between the slavery case and the other cases in which reparations payments 
have been allowed: much more water has flowed under the bridge in the 
slavery case than in any of other reparations case in which payments were 
actually made; thus, there has been a greater change in the constituency of the 
alleged wrongdoing country in this case. Indeed, there has been complete 
turnover many times over. 
Another problem with holding the U.S. government responsible for slavery 
is that, if corrective justice is truly the aim, the U.S. government and by 
extension the U.S. taxpayers are the wrong targets. A slavery reparations 
program designed to achieve corrective justice should be much more narrowly 
tailored. For example, imagine a regime of special taxes to be imposed on the 
critiques). Ultimately, as this article suggests, I have not been persuaded by the corrective 
justice justification for slavery reparations. 
58 After all, such an argument did not stop Congress from compensating the Japanese 
American internees even though all of the members of Congress and the citizens from that 
period were either dead or very old. 
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descendants of slave owners and slave traders. Alternatively, if such a tax 
were considered impractical, because of the difficulty of identifying who is 
descended from slave owners; perhaps a special tax on families whose 
ancestors lived in the south during the slavery period would be close enough. 
Or, to make things even simpler (albeit less accurate), a special tax could be 
imposed on whites living in the south today, or maybe on the state 
governments that were members of the Confederacy and their current 
taxpayers. All of these alternative proposals would at least represent an 
attempt to assign blame roughly to those individuals - or, more accurately, to 
the descendants of those individuals - who were responsible for, or directly 
benefited from, the slave trade. It is true that northern states (and the nation as 
a whole) profited financially from the institution of slavery.59 However, if the 
object of corrective justice is to assign relative blame, and if we are going to 
take the whole notion of ancestry seriously, it is difficult to see how 
descendants of slave owners or of the southern aristocracy should not be 
expected to endure an extra measure of pain. Thus, the alternatives mentioned 
sound a lot more like corrective justice than does a program of taxing all 
whites to pay all blacks. 
What is interesting is that none of these ideas - neither a special tax on 
southerners nor one on descendants of slave owners, nor one on southern states 
- has been seriously proposed by any recent advocate of slavery reparations.60 
That fact can perhaps best be explained in terms of politics. To argue that the 
costs of slavery reparations should be borne entirely or primarily by a discrete, 
identifiable group - one probably capable of effective political action - would 
doom the proposal from the start. But the whole idea of slavery reparations 
seems a political non-starter, and yet it has received considerable attention of 
late. Thus, it seems unlikely that political constraints are what have stopped 
people from even suggesting a special tax be imposed on the descendants of 
slave owners or on southern states. A more likely explanation, and one that 
supports a primary thesis of this Article, is that slavery reparations proponents 
really want something other than to assign specific blame for the particular 
injustices associated with slavery. They want to reduce overall racial 
inequality.61 
A second category of objections to slavery reparations qua corrective justice 
involves the payee side. Recall that in both the Japanese American and the 
Holocaust-survivor cases, the intended beneficiaries were living victims of the 
actual injustice. Such a statement could not be made about slavery reparations, 
or even about Jim Crow reparations (unless the benefits were limited to a very 
59 See Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4, 5 n.2 ( 1 985). 
60 One exception to this statement would be the proposal by one radical reparations 
group that five southern states be given to blacks for the purpose of forming a separate black 
nation. See Conley, supra note 9, at 1 19. 
61 See infra Part II (discussing more fully the goal of reducing racial and social 
inequality). 
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small fraction o f  the living African American population). The difficulty is 
that, when we move beyond the generation that was actually injured by the 
wrongdoers to later generations who were allegedly harmed, and only 
indirectly so, we encounter certain conceptual problems, such as the issue that 
some slavery descendants might not have been born but for the institution of 
slavery. 
More importantly, we encounter certain problems of proof. For example, an 
important initial question would be whether reparations claimants would be 
required to show that they are worse off than they would have been had slavery 
never occurred. Would they have to show that, absent slavery, they would 
have been born citizens of some African country and therefore would have 
been better off? Or would they have to show, alternatively, that they would 
still have been born U.S. citizens, because their ancestors would have 
emigrated here as free people, and they would have been better off for that 
reason? Whatever the method of calculating damages, the computations - and 
the proof of the underlying facts - would be extremely difficult. Indeed, this 
problem is precisely why the payments in the Holocaust-survivor and Japanese 
American reparations programs were limited to the actual victims of those 
injustices.62 Moreover, these same concerns explain why tort law - our 
paradigmatic example of corrective justice - generally does not acknowledge 
intergenerational injuries.63 Thus, under a corrective justice approach, 
payments must be limited to descendants of slaves, leading to the impossible 
task of determining who is a slavery descendant, what to do with individuals of 
mixed-raced ancestry, and how to handle the situation in which a claimant's 
family tree includes both slaves and slave owners.64 
Given all of these obstacles to achieving true corrective justice through 
slavery reparations, how are we to understand and evaluate the recent slavery 
reparations lawsuits and their attempts to assign blame to (and seek damages 
from) particular corporations that have historical ties to the institution of 
slavery? Such lawsuits, which are both a product of and a cause of the recent 
resurgence of interest in slavery reparations generally, seem to be fashioned on 
the products liability, class action, toxic-tort analogy discussed above. The 
interesting question is whether such reparations suits can possibly achieve 
anything that resembles corrective justice. Or, alternatively, if some form of 
distributive justice is the goal, can such redistributive lawsuits avoid the 
problems that typically undermine redistributive legal rules? I will discuss the 
second question in Part II below. 
62 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1 8, at 691 -92 (observing differences between 
reparations for Japanese-American internees and Holocaust-survivors as opposed to 
reparations for African Americans). 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 49-5 1 .  
64 There is, of course, an analogous problem of dealing with individuals of mixed-race 
ancestry in a program of racial redistribution that is justified on distributive justice rather 
than corrective justice grounds. See infra Part II. 
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As to the first question, the problem is not so much that lawsuits are the 
wrong way to go about achieving corrective justice (generally they are a good 
way to achieve corrective justice); the problem is that, for the reasons already 
mentioned having to do with the passage of time, achieving corrective justice 
in the case of slavery at this late date just is not plausible. One can, in theory, 
imagine some exceptional cases. For example, if a particular individual 
hypothetically could prove that his ancestor was forced to provide slave labor 
to a particular corporation, which corporation still exists today, a case for 
recovery based on corrective justice could be made, ignoring statutes of 
limitations for the moment. But in the real world, problems of proof - and the 
practical inability to link payer, payee, wrongdoing, and harm - make such a 
hypothetical fanciful in the extreme.65 Moreover, and this is the most 
important point, even if we decide that making a particular group of 
corporations pay something for their historic involvement in slavery (and we 
thus waive the statute of limitations in this case), and we decide to make those 
funds available to individuals who can somehow prove that one or more of 
their ancestors were slaves, the resulting reparations program would not much 
resemble the sort of broad-based redistributive transfers from whites to blacks 
that most reparations proponents have called for and that would respond to the 
broad-based racial inequality that seems to be a major motivating factor 
underlying the reparations movement. 
E. Summary 
In sum, although corrective justice provides a powerful and intuitive 
rationale for reparative recovery in certain private law settings, there are limits 
to the applicability of the corrective-justice idea, and those limits are reached 
in the slavery reparations setting. For the reasons summarized above, 
corrective justice does not provide a persuasive justification for broad-based 
redistributive transfers from white taxpayers to black taxpayers. Moreover, if 
we take seriously the corrective justice idea and apply it straightforwardly to 
the slavery-reparations question, and assuming we could overcome the 
problems of proof discussed above, we would likely arrive at a program that 
would be fairly narrow in scope and that would not respond to the issue that 
seems to be at the heart of many slavery reparations proposals : the problem of 
racial inequality. 
II. SLAVERY REPARATIONS AS DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
In the complaint filed in the federal class-action slavery reparations lawsuit, 
In re African-Americans Slave Descendants Litigation,66 the plaintiffs included 
the following grim statistics: 
65 And this conclusion is entirely consistent with toxic tort jurisprudence, and tort law 
generally, which, as far as I know, has never allowed any claim this "old" to be successfully 
brought. 
66 304 F. Supp. 2d 1 027 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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[A] 1 998 census report shows that 26 percent of African American people 
in the United States live in poverty compared to 8 percent of whites. It 
also showed that 14.  7 percent of African Americans have four-year 
college degrees, compared with 25 percent of whites. The same year, 
African American infant-mortality rates were more than twice as high as 
those among whites. Federal figures also show that a Black person born 
in 1 996 can expect to live, on average, 6.6 fewer years than a white 
person born the same year. 
African-Americans are more likely to go to jail, to be there longer, and if 
their crime is eligible, to receive the death penalty. They lag behind 
whites according to every social yardstick: literacy, life expectancy, 
income and education. They are more likely to be murdered and less 
likely to have a father at home.67 
These data only begin to tell the story of the persistent and substantial 
inequality between blacks and whites in the United States. In this Part, I argue 
that there is a fairly intuitive and basic normative argument that such 
inequalities ought to be reduced. And just as various normative arguments for 
rectifying wrongful harms have been grouped under the label corrective 
justice, the idea of reducing societal inequality of one form or another -
including racial inequality - has traditionally been called distributive justice. 
This Part explains what I mean by the term distributive justice, it discusses 
how racial inequality fits within that understanding, and it suggests briefly how 
redistributive policy might (and to some extent already does) usefully respond 
to the problem of racial inequality. 
A. Defining Distributive Justice 
As mentioned in the previous Part, distributive justice is, in the most general 
terms, the idea that scarce societal benefits and burdens ought to be distributed 
fairly across the members of society. Put that way, of course, everyone is in 
favor of distributive justice. Disagreements arise over what is a "fair" 
distribution of society's resources. For some people, any allocation of 
resources produced by voluntary exchange within a market economy would be 
considered distributively just.68 Under such a libertarian vision of society, 
there is no persuasive justification for government-compelled redistributive 
transfers from the rich to the poor. Thus, a libertarian, for example, would 
oppose a progressive income tax system as well as many other aspects of the 
U.S. social safety net, such as the various forms of social insurance. Indeed, 
the only legitimate purpose of taxation for libertarians is to finance a minimal 
government whose only function would be to enforce property rights and 
67 See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 
supra note 1 5, at '1] 1 8- 19. 
68 This is one plausible interpretation of Nozick's position, for example. See ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 224-27 ( 1974). 
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generally keep the peace - and perhaps to provide other classic public goods. 
That sort of libertarian vision, however, is not what most political philosophers 
have in mind when they speak of distributive justice. At least since the 
publication of John Rawls 's influential book A Theory of Justice in 1 97 1 ,  the 
dominant approach among distributive justice theorists has been to pursue one 
version or another of egalitarianism.69 Thus, when I use the term distributive 
justice, I will mean egalitarian distributive justice. Although there are many 
different conceptions of egalitarianism, I will not try to review them all here; 
rather, I will discuss only a few of the key elements common to most of the 
theories. 
Egalitarian distributive justice describes a collection of normative theories 
that are deployed to justify not only reducing societal inequality but using the 
state's coercive power to do so - through taxes and transfers, for example.70 
Egalitarians, however, do not object to all inequality and thus do not regard all 
inequality as grounds for government intervention. To the contrary, under 
most theories of distributive justice, some inequality is desirable, some is 
inevitable, and some is just trivial. The point of mainstream egalitarian 
distributive justice, rather, is merely to shift the burden of proof. For 
egalitarians, in other words, it is inequality rather than redistribution that 
requires a justification; and if a particular inequality cannot be justified, a 
presumptive conclusion is that the state's power to tax and transfer resources 
will be used to reduce or eliminate it. 
One of the most famous formulations of egalitarian distributive justice is 
Rawls's "difference principle," which holds that inequality with respect to 
"primary social goods" - a category that includes income and wealth, 
opportunities and powers, rights and liberties, but that excludes natural talent 
and health, for example71 - is permissible only to the extent that it enhances the 
well-being of the least well off in society. Any inequality of primary social 
goods that does not satisfy this difference principle should be, in Rawls's view, 
eliminated through government redistributive policy. Inequalities with respect 
to natural goods, however, are not legitimate targets of redistributive policy, 
according to Rawls. Probably most egalitarian theorists, and certainly most 
U.S. voters, would regard the difference principle as too extreme, as giving too 
much weight to the welfare of the least well off. Moreover, the dominant view 
among egalitarian philosophers today is that "natural" inequalities, those 
69 See generally RAWLS, supra note 35. 
70 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 65-92 (2000) (discussing the idea of a tax system aimed at determining what 
proportion of an individual's income is attributable to differential talents as opposed to 
differential ambitions). 
71 RAWLS, supra note 35, at 54. Rawls, thus, does not see inequality with respect to 
natural ability or health - which are types of "natural primary natural" in his terminology -
as legitimate targets for government redistribution. Id. Rawls has been criticized for 
making this distinction by subsequent egalitarian philosophers, including the luck 
egalitarians described in the text immediately below. 
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resulting in some sense from nature (such as differences in natural talent and in 
health), should also be considered potentially legitimate targets for 
redistributive policy. 72 Indeed, this is the view of what some consider the 
dominant version of egalitarian distributive justice among egalitarian theorists 
today, so-called "luck egalitarianism" or "equality of fortune." Luck 
egalitarianism holds that inequality of either social primary goods or natural 
goods (to use Rawls's terminology) is desirable if, but only if, such inequality 
is the product of informed, voluntary choices. 73 Thus, inequality that is not the 
product of informed, voluntary choices - or, in Ronald Dworkin's terms, 
inequality that is the product of pure "brute luck"74 - is considered arbitrary, 
underserved, and hence a valid target for redistributive policy. 
The intuitive appeal of this luck/choice distinction is captured in the 
following quote from philosopher Will Kymlicka: 
It is unjust if people are disadvantaged by inequalities in their 
circumstances, but it is equally unjust for me to demand that someone 
else pay for the costs of my choices. In more technical language, a 
distributive scheme should be "endowment-insensitive" and "ambition­
sensitive." People's fate should depend on their ambitions (in the broad 
sense of goals and projects about life), but should not depend on their 
natural and social endowments (the circumstances in which they pursue 
their ambitions.)75 
Under luck egalitarianism, then, if one person acquires a fortune solely by 
dint of her ambition, hard work, and wise business decisions, she should be 
allowed to keep it. You eat what you kill, as the saying goes. By the same 
token, if another individual knowingly chooses a path of poverty - opting, for 
example, to quit her high-paying job to become a homeless surfer - that person 
should not receive redistributive transfers. You made your own bed, now you 
lie in it, would be the analogous saying. Thus, under luck egalitarianism, the 
inequality of resources between a diligent worker and an indolent surfer would 
be not only permissible but desirable, given the differences in their choices. 
When there are differences in ambition and willingness to work, there ought to 
be differences in well-being. Luck egalitarianism, however, would support the 
use of state power to require or encourage a redistributive transfer for any 
inequality attributable to the accidents of birth, or to any circumstance that is 
beyond human control. This is what is meant by "endowment-insensitive": A 
person's lot in life should not depend on - should be insensitive to - her 
endowment or inheritance. A version of this intuition has long served to 
justify the existence in the U.S. and in other countries of a steeply progressive 
72 See DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 9 1 -92. 
73 See RAWLS, supra note 35, at 60-65. 
74 See DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 73-78. 
75 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 75 
( 1990) (quoting Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources, 1 0  PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 283, 3 1 1  ( 1 98 1 ). 
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inheritance tax, as taxes on inheritance can be seen as an effort to tax pure luck 
or endowment-based transfers. 
Luck egalitarianism has obvious intuitive appeal. While it calls for 
eliminating arbitrary inequalities, such as those created and perpetuated by 
inheritance, it also incorporates the concepts of free will and personal 
responsibility that many philosophers, and most people, find attractive. Luck 
egalitarianism, however, also is vulnerable to a number of criticisms. First, 
and perhaps most obvious, there is tr..e libertarian critique mentioned above. 
For a libertarian, any egalitarian theory of distributive justice is unacceptable, 
as societal inequality - whether the result of pure luck or pure choice - is part 
of the natural order of things. Thus, for a libertarian, slavery reparations can 
be justified in terms of corrective justice or not at all.76 
Second, there is a determinist critique of luck egalitarianism, or, more 
accurately, a determinist critique of the luck-choice distinction. Causal 
determinism holds that all human actions are the product of prior causes and 
that therefore no particular human action can be attributed to an individual's 
free choice.77 According to such a view, even ambition, good judgment, and 
industriousness, as well as their opposites, are the result of prior causes, a 
combination of genetic inheritance and environmental stimuli. If the 
determinist position is taken to its most extreme conclusion, the distinction 
between luck and choice disappears entirely. But so does the idea of free will 
and personal responsibility, and few theorists, and fewer people generally seem 
prepared to accept that position. Moreover, even if one is sympathetic to 
causal determinism, at least as applied to questions of distributive justice, and 
thus is unwilling to "blame" poverty on the poor, it would not necessarily 
76 Nozick, for example, explicitly addresses the idea of rectifying past wrongs, but he is 
unclear with respect to how far back the principle should reach and how specifically it 
should be applied. NOZICK, supra note 68, at 230-3 1 .  It is possible to offer a corrective­
j ustice type argument in favor of some forms of slavery reparations, but such an approach, if 
taken seriously, would seem to suggest a program significantly narrower than a regime of 
broad-based redistribution from all whites to all blacks. See supra Part I. 
77 Causal determinism is the thesis that all laws of nature are deterministic laws, in the 
sense that they are compatible with only one future. See generally AGENCY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS ON THE METAPHYSICS OF FREEDOM (Laura Waddell Ekstrom ed., 
2000); John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Introduction to PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 8-9 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1 993). Incompatibilists 
believe that causal determinism and free will are logically inconsistent. Hard determinists 
are incompatibilists who believe that determinism is true and therefore free will is not 
possible. See, e.g. , PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL 1 9-22 ( 1983) (arguing 
that determinism is incompatible with free will). It is this sort of hard determinist critique of 
luck egalitarianism that I am responding to in the text. By contrast, compatabilists, or those 
who believe that determinism and free will are potentially consistent, should have no 
problem with the luck/choice distinction drawn by luck egalitarians. And of course, 
incompatibilists who are not determinists - or who believe that determinism is just false -
should also be open to the luck-choice distinction. 
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imply that one would be opposed to the idea of egalitarian distributive justice. 
To the contrary, if all inequality is the result of arbitrary circumstances beyond 
human control, the case for some type of redistributive program becomes even 
stronger. However, because I suspect that most voters and taxpayers, and a 
fair percentage of political theorists (and conservative critics of slavery 
reparations), regard the luck-choice distinction as normatively meaningful and 
important, I will continue to use it in the analysis that follows. 
B. Luck Egalitarianism in the Real World 
A related but more practical critique of luck egalitarianism derives from the 
fact that every important example of inequality in the real world will likely be 
the result of a combination of luck and choice. Many rich people, for example, 
amass their fortunes through a combination of hard work, smart choices, and 
pure good luck, and many poor people are poor because of a combination of 
bad luck and bad choices. That fact presents a problem for any real-world 
redistributive policy that seeks to make the luck-choice distinction. What, 
then, is a luck-egalitarian redistributive policymaker to do? The answer is 
either to do nothing (abandon any effort to reduce inequality) or to do 
something (attempt to reduce inequality) knowing that there will be some 
degree of inaccuracy and imperfection in the process - that some who deserve 
to receive transfers will not receive them or will receive less than they deserve, 
and some who ought to pay high taxes will get off easy, and so on. Given the 
choices that have been made in this country, the do-nothing option seems out 
of the question. That· is to say, the U.S. government does in fact engage in a 
fair amount of redistribution, although only in an imperfect and imprecise way, 
and U.S. voters and taxpayers generally seem to approve. 
Consider the example of the U.S. federal tax-and-transfer system, which 
overall has a significant redistributive or "progressive" element. A progressive 
tax system is one in which average tax rates rise as income rises, 78 and average 
federal tax rates in the U.S. are uniformly progressive and have been so for 
many years.79 Thus, for example, the lowest-quintile earners in 200 1 paid 5 .4 
percent and the highest-quintile earners paid 26.8 percent of their income in 
78 HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 256 (6th ed. 2002) (defining a progressive 
taxation regime). 
79 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979-2001 ,  at 
tbl . lA (2004), available at www.cbo.gov/Pubs.cfm (last accessed Sept. 8, 2004). The top 1 
percent in 2001 ,  the very highest earning individuals, paid 33 percent. Id. (listing effective 
federal tax rates for the top one percent of earners). Studies of effective tax rates by the 
U.S. Treasury Department use a different definition of income than those conducted by the 
CBO and therefore tend to show a slightly smaller degree of progressivity. See generally 
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT 
DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 7 1 -72 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing differences in the CBO's and 
the Treasury Department's assumptions assessing the incidence of federal taxes). 
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federal taxes.80 Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the expenditure 
side of the federal budget also is at least moderately progressive, thereby 
increasing the overall progressivity - or redistributive nature - of the federal 
tax-and-transfer system.81 Of the total expenditures by the federal government, 
a sizeable percentage goes to so-called entitlements or mandatory 
(nondiscretionary) spending programs, and those programs tend to be weighted 
heavily in favor of lower-income individuals. 82 
For example, Social Security benefits, which constitute the single largest 
item of nondiscretionary federal spending, 83 are structured explicitly to be 
progressive, although the story is complicated by the fact that some of the 
redistribution is from husbands to wives (or, more generally, from workers to 
non-working spouses of workers). Medicare payments also exhibit a 
significant redistributive component, as does Medicaid. 84 If federal spending 
programs, overall, tend . to be even mildly progressive, combined with the 
undisputed (albeit modest) progressivity of the federal tax system, then it 
would be hard to deny that the federal tax-and-transfer regime overall is indeed 
substantially progressive - or redistributive from the better off to the less well 
off - although much inequality obviously remains. 
The other real-world response to the problem of mixed luck-choice 
inequality is to design the redistributive program in a way that makes 
distinctions between the effects of luck and the effects of choice. This 
approach too can be seen in some parts of the U.S. income tax system. To take 
one example, under the Internal Revenue Code, an individual taxpayer in 
arriving at taxable income is entitled to deduct extraordinary uninsured 
medical expenses;85 however, the medical expense deduction is denied for 
80 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 79, at tbl. l A  (listing effective federal 
tax rates by income quintile). Moreover, average federal tax rates have been consistently 
progressive throughout the 1980s and 90s, despite numerous changes in the tax laws during 
that period. The smallest degree of progressivity, or redistribution within the federal tax 
system, existed during the Reagan years, when the effective rate for the top l percent 
dropped to a low of 25.5 percent (in 1 986) and the rate for the bottom quintile rose to a high 
of l 0.2 percent (in 1 984). Id. 
8 1 Gene Steuerle, The Progressivity of Taxes and Expenditures, 75 TAX NOTES 835, 835-
36 ( 1 997) (noting that in all modem industrial economies, the combined tax and expenditure 
structure is inevitably progressive). 
82 See id. 
83 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 1-2,  1 9  
(2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/Pubs.cfm (last accessed Sept. 14, 2004) (observing 
that social security is the federal government's largest income-redistribution program and 
noting that in 2003, government spending on social security composed 4.2% of GDP, while 
government spending on Medicare composed 3 .9%). 
84 DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR MEDICARE? 33-39 (2004) (discussing the 
distributional effects of the current Medicare regime). 
85 I.R.C. § 2 1 3(a) (2000) (allowing for the deduction of uninsured medical expenses 
during a taxable year, so long as said expenses exceed 7.5 of adjusted gross income). 
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medical procedures that are merely cosmetic, defined as "any procedure which 
is directed at improving the patient's appearance and does not meaningfully 
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or 
disease."86 The theory obviously is that such cosmetic expenses are purely 
matters of consumption choice and not of necessity. As support for this 
conclusion, note that cosmetic surgery, as defined by the Code, does not 
include any surgery or procedure "necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising 
from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury 
resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease. "87 Thus, surgery 
to repair a birth defect or to undo the effects of an accident is deductible, but 
surgery merely to improve one's appearance is not. 
Along the same lines, a taxpayer can deduct the cost of unexpected and 
uninsured damage to her home if that damage exceeds a certain threshold 
amount, but the deduction is disallowed if the damage was caused intentionally 
or even recklessly by the taxpayer.88 And the reasoning is the same: If a 
taxpayer intentionally or recklessly destroys her house, her reduction in well­
being is primarily a matter of personal choice rather than happenstance; thus, 
the tax system allows her to deduct such losses in calculating her taxable 
income. Despite these and other examples of the tax system's attempt to fine­
tune the measure of relative well-being and to draw some luck-choice 
distinctions, much inaccuracy remains. Such inaccuracy, again, is one of the 
reasons that partial equalization is the only plausible aim of any real-world 
redistributive program. 
C. Luck Egalitarianism and Racial Inequality 
To recap, luck egalitarianism provides an intuitive rationale for establishing 
government programs designed to eliminate pure luck-based inequality. 
However, because most inequality in the world is the result of a combination 
of luck and choice, all real-world redistributive programs should - and in fact 
do - attempt only partial equalization. Therefore, under real-world 
redistributive programs, inequality is reduced but not eliminated. Moreover, 
real-world redistribution inevitably involves some degree of imprecision or 
inaccuracy. That is the nature of the beast. How does all of this apply to 
slavery reparations? Again, given the nature of the remedies sought by most 
reparations proponents, the primary motivating factor underlying the slavery 
reparations movement seems to be substantial and persistent inequality 
between blacks and whites. As the quote from the slavery reparations suit 
suggests, blacks as a group lag behind whites in every meaningful measure of 
social and economic well-being: income, wealth, housing, education, 
employment, health, life expectancy, and even subjective assessments of 
86 Id. § 2 1 3(d)(9)(B) (defining cosmetic surgery). 
87 Id. § 2 1 3(d)(9)(A). 
88 See id. § 1 65 (describing deductible losses). 
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individual happiness.89 Consider some of the most recent evidence of these 
inequalities. 
With respect to income, the median household income for blacks in 2002 
was approximately $29,000; the median income for whites was around 
$47,000.90 This means that blacks in that year earned approximately $0.62 for 
every $ 1.00 whites earned, a ratio that has remained unchanged for many 
years.91 In addition, according to the most recent U.S. Census report, roughly 
twenty-four percent of blacks, but only eight percent of whites, fell below the 
poverty line.92 This disparity was even greater with respect to children: 
whereas around nine percent of white children lived in poverty in 2002, around 
thirty-two percent of black children did.93 Perhaps the most important 
indicator of inequality between blacks and whites is the difference in 
household wealth.94 According to a study that used 1994 data, the median net 
worth of black households was around $9,77 1; whereas the median net worth 
for white households was roughly $72,000. This means that the average white 
household had more than six times as much wealth as the average black 
89 See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
ADVISERS (FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE), CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 2 ( 1998) [hereinafter 
CHANGING AMERICA] (noting that race is a statistical predictor of well-being in American 
society and observing racial disadvantages Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians suffer 
vis-a-vis Whites and Asians in terms of health, education, and economic status). This report 
compiles data from a number of sources, including, but not limited to, data from the 1 990 
Census and more recent Census surveys. 
9o U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 3 tbl. l (2003), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-22 l .pdf (last accessed Sept. 7, 2004). 
91 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 200 1 ,  at 5 fig. l (2002), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-21 8 .pdf (last accessed Sept. 7, 2004). The 
disparity in the mean household incomes is just as stark: Whites ($60, 1 16); Blacks 
($40,0 1 1 ). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, supra note 
90, at 1 7- 19  tbl.A-1 (listing mean household income for whites and blacks in 2002). The 
size of the income gap between blacks and whites has remained fairly stable since at least 
1 967. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 200 1 ,  supra, at 5 fig. l 
(2002). 
92 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 2 tbl. l (2003), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf (last accessed Sept. 7, 2004) (presenting 
2002 data and listing the percentage of Americans living below the poverty line by race). 
The official measure of poverty is based on various income thresholds for households of 
various sizes and types. Thus, for example, a household of four, with two adults and two 
children, would be considered below the poverty threshold if the total household money 
income (before taxes and excluding capital gains and noncash benefits) fell below $ 18,244 
in 2002. Id. at 4. 
93 Id. at 29-30 tbl.A-2 (listing poverty status by age and race). 
94 "Net worth" is defined here to include the excess of value of all assets, including 
owner-occupied housing and financial assets, over total household liabilities. 
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household.95 According to a different study, which used 1 999 data, the racial 
wealth gap was even larger : with the median white household having $8 1 ,000 
in net worth and the median black household having $8,000 : a ten-to-one 
wealth differentia/.96 
The substantial and persistent inequalities between blacks and whites are not 
limited to income and wealth. Disparities can be found with respect to 
virtually every important measure of well-being. With respect to housing, for 
example, a much higher percentage of blacks than whites have high housing­
cost burdens,97 live in housing units with serious or moderate physical 
problems,98 live in crowded circumstances,99 and report problems in their 
neighborhood ranging from crime to litter to poor public services.100 
With respect to education, black children drop out of high school at a much 
greater rate than do white children: seventeen percent compared to eleven 
percent.101 Fewer blacks have a high school degree or its equivalent than do 
95 DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, L IVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SQCIAL 
POLICY IN AMERICA 26-27, app. tbl.A2. l  ( 1999). In addition, whereas almost ten percent of 
white households had a negative net worth (liabilities in excess of assets), over thirty 
percent of black households do. Id. For the lowest income groups (annual incomes below 
$ 15,001 ), twenty-three percent of white families were in the red compared with fifty percent 
of blacks. Id. Although some of the racial wealth gap is attributable to differences in 
homeownership rates - fewer than fifty percent of black families own their own home 
compared with more than seventy percent of whites. CHANGING AMERICA, supra note 89, at 
62. However, home ownership rates do not explain the entire wealth gap. To the contrary, 
the disparity in financial assets (which are assets other than home equity or other consumer 
durables) is ever greater. Thus, excluding home-equity from consideration, the median 
wealth for white households in 1 994 was $29,000, compared to $2,000 for blacks - a ratio 
of almost fifteen to one. CONLEY, supra, at app. tbl.A2.2. 
96 THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: How WEAL TH 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 47 (2004) (observing that according to 1 999 data, black families 
possess ten cents for every dollar of wealth held by white families). 
97 CHANGING AMERICA, supra note 89, at 63 (charting the percentage of households, by 
race, with high housing-cost burdens). High housing-cost burdens are defined as paying 
thirty percent or more of household income on housing. 
98 Id. at 64 ("Severe physical problems include lack of indoor plumbing, inadequate 
heating, electrical problems, and other serious upkeep problems. Moderate physical 
problems include problems with heating or plumbing or the lack of a kitchen sink, 
refrigerator, or stove burners."). 
99 Id. at 65 (defining a house as crowded if it has more than one ·person per room. Rooms 
used for living space are counted, including bedrooms, living rooms, and kitchens, but 
bathrooms are excluded.). 
100 Id. at 66 (comparing reported neighborhood problems by race). 
101 POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY, DROPOUT RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY 
AND GENDER 1 974 TO 2002, at 
http://www.postsecondary.org/archives/Reports/Spreadsheets/EntranceRate.htm (last 
accessed Sept. 8, 2004) (presenting 2002 data regarding high school dropout rates by sex 
and race). 
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whites: eighty-seven percent compared to ninety-three percent.102 Fewer 
blacks have at least four years of college: fourteen percent compared to thirty­
three percent of whites.103 The employment picture is not much better. The 
black unemployment rate is twice that of whites, a ratio that has persisted for 
more than twenty years. 104 A black worker on average receives $0.74 of wages 
for every $ 1.00 a white worker receives for a given hour of labor; 105 and, not 
unrelated, a relatively low percentage of blacks are found in the higher-skilled 
and higher-status professions such as law and medicine.106 
Some of the worst racial inequalities are in the health area. Infant mortality 
among black babies is more than double that of white babies.107 Blacks fare 
far worse than whites in terms of the number of years with a "chronically 
impair[ing]" health condition. 108 Moreover, with respect to two of the biggest 
killer diseases - heart disease and cancer - blacks are substantially worse off 
than whites, with black men at eighty-five percent greater risk of heart disease 
and seventy percent greater risk of cancer than white men, while black women 
suffer a one hundred fifty percent greater risk of heart disease and thirty-four 
percent greater risk of cancer than white women.109 One of the most striking 
statistics is that blacks face almost nine times the risk of death by homicide 
that whites face.110 Given the various disparities in risk of death, both from 
disease and crime, it comes as no surprise that the overall life expectancy at 
birth of an African American is roughly seven years shorter than that of a 
white person. 111 
to2 CHANGING AMERICA, supra note 89, at 2 1  (using 1998 data to compare high school 
completion rates for 25-29 year old whites and blacks with at least a four year college 
degree). 
103 Id. at 22 (comparing white and black unemployment rates between 1954 and 1 997 
and stating that the black unemployment rate has been twice that of whites for more than 
twenty years). 
104 Id. at 26. In 2003, the unemployment rate for whites hovered around five percent, 
whereas the rate for blacks was between ten and eleven percent. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, at 
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab2.htm (last accessed Sept. 8, 2004). 
105 CHANGING AMERICA, supra note 89, at 30 (using 1997 data to chart black wages as a 
percentage of white wages). 
106 Id. at 32 (graphing the professions of employed persons by race and gender). 
to7 Id. at 43 (comparing infant mortality rates by race from 1 983 to 1 995). 
108 Mark D. Hayward et al., The Significance of Socioeconomic Status in Explaining the 
Racial Gap in Chronic Health Conditions, 65 AM. Soc. REv. 9 1 0, 91 1 (reviewing recent 
empirical research on the racial health gap and stating the importance of understanding the 
relationship between race and incidence of chronic illness). 
to9 CHANGING AMERICA, supra note 89, at 48 (comparing death rates caused by heart 
disease and cancer by sex and race for persons aged forty-five to sixty-five). 
1 10 Id. at 4 7, 53 (charting death rates by cause and race for persons aged fifteen to thirty­
four in 1994 and 1 995 and showing victims of homicide, by race, from 1950 to 1 995). 
1 1 1  Id. at 44 (comparing life expectancy at birth among black men and women and white 
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Given this strong correlation between racial status and relative well-being, 
the egalitarian argument for a substantial program of redistribution along racial 
lines - in particular, from whites to blacks - is obvious and, in a sense, 
uncontroversial. Whites are significantly better off on average than blacks in 
almost every way. Moreover, the types of inequalities that exist between 
blacks and whites in the U.S. - differences in wealth, income, education, 
employment, health, housing, and personal safety - are inequalities that lie at 
the core of virtually every theory of egalitarian distributive justice. In other 
words, if egalitarian distributive justice is about anything, it is about reducing 
precisely these sorts of inequalities. As such, there is a prima facie egalitarian 
case for some level of redistribution. Given the discussion of the luck-choice 
distinction above, however, the next obvious question is whether any or all of 
these inequalities can properly be attributed to differences in voluntary, 
informed choices. 
If whites on average have higher incomes, more wealth, better educations, 
and better health only because they work harder, study more, and take better 
care of themselves, then racial redistribution would make little sense, at least 
not on luck-egalitarian grounds. Thus, the question arises as to how much of 
the racial gap in well-being is due to luck and how much is due to choice? I do 
not pretend to be able to answer this question. Still, it seems almost beyond 
debate that much of the inequality that currently exists between blacks and 
whites is attributable in some way to a version· of bad brute luck. A full 
defense of this assertion is beyond the scope of this article, but here are a few 
tentative thoughts. First, much of the inequality between blacks and whites 
involves children. Black children, for example, are more likely to die as 
infants, more likely to be born into poverty, more likely to be uninsured, more 
likely to be abused or neglected, and more likely to drop out of school than 
white children, to name just a few of the inequalities. 112 Obviously, black 
children are not to blame for these problems, and to the extent blacks suffer as 
adults because of such inequalities experienced as children, they too cannot be 
considered fully responsible for the result. 
Second, it is unclear how systematic inequality between blacks and whites 
generally could be attributed to voluntary, informed choices. That is, even if 
we might attribute a particular individual's bad situation (e.g., poor education 
or low-wage job or bad neighborhood) largely to his own bad choices, what 
sort of story would explain why an entire race of people would tend to make 
voluntary and informed choices that leave them, on average, lagging behind 
their white counterparts? If some combination of slavery, Jim Crow, and 
men and women). 
1 12 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, 40 YEARS OF PROGRESS AND PERIL: RACIAL INEQUALITIES 
SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1 964, at 
http://www.childrensdefense.org/data/40_years_of_progress_and_peril.pdf (last accessed 
Sept. 8, 2004) (comparing statistics related to white and black demographics, education, 
mortality, and poverty in 1 964 and 2003). 
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current discrimination is not the explanation, then what is? It is not clear what 
other explanations are available that do not also suggest bad brute luck. There 
is the discredited (and, by definition, racist) genetic-inferiority story that not 
even conservatives make any longer. And there is the culture-of-poverty story, 
which is more fashionable today and which says that black culture is either 
inherently inferior or, in the alternative, was badly damaged by the ill­
conceived liberal welfare policies of the Great Society. What is interesting is 
that even those two explanations - inferior genes or inferior (or damaged) 
culture - whether you find them plausible or repulsive, are stories of bad brute 
luck and not of individual moral failure. Therefore, if those were the 
explanations, they would in fact support, not undermine, the argument for 
redistributive transfers. 
Finally, consider a different approach to understanding racial inequality, one 
that is based on a slight variation on the intergenerational-wealth-transfer 
argument suggested by Dalton Conley and which I mentioned in the 
introduction. 113 As it turns out, there is considerable evidence that wealth 
strongly correlates with a number of the other important dimensions of well­
being. For example, studies show that, if we control for differences in wealth 
between individuals and households of different races, many other well-being 
gaps between the races diminish.1 14 Thus, it seems that the huge disparities in 
household wealth between blacks and whites - as much as a ten to one 
disparity - may have a lot to do with, and may actually cause, the large 
differences in other measures of well-being between whites and blacks. But 
that conclusion begs the next question: What is the cause of the wealth gap? Is 
the problem that blacks simply do not save as much of their current income, 
and thus do not accumulate as much wealth during their lifetimes, as whites 
do? If so, the wealth gap, and the well-being gap more generally, might be 
considered primarily an issue of personal responsibility. 
The available evidence, however, seems to suggest otherwise. In a recent 
book, for example, sociologist Thomas Shapiro, using the most comprehensive 
data-set yet applied to this question and using the latest economic theories in 
how wealth is accumulated, concluded that much of the net-worth gap between 
blacks and whites is almost certainly the result of multiple generations of 
inheritance.1 1 5  To summarize this last argument: (a) �he black-white wealth 
113 See supra notes 9- 1 1  and accompanying text. 
114 See CONLEY, supra note 95, at 6 1  (citing a study observing that living amongst a 
greater proportion of neighbors with incomes over $30,000 positively affects a five-year­
old' s cognitive development and reduces the risk of dropping out of high school among 
adolescents); David Williams & Chiquita Collins, US Socioeconomic and Racial 
Differences in Health: Patterns and Explanations, 2 1  ANN. REV. Soc. 349, 363-65 ( 1995) 
(observing that adjusting racial disparities in health, violent deaths, and illegal drug use by 
socioeconomic status substantially reduces those disparities) . 
1 1 5  SHAPIRO, supra note 96, at 60-84. Inheritance here is defined broadly to include not 
only gifts of cash and property at death but also inter-vivos gifts from parents to their 
children in the form of college tuition or help with home down payments and the like. 
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gap is probably attributable mostly to differences in patterns of inheritance 
between black families and white families over the generations, a 
quintessential example of luck-based inequality; (b) that wealth gap explains 
much of the overall inequality between blacks and whites (given the 
importance of wealth on various other measures of well-being); therefore, (c) 
the overall black-white well-being gap is also largely an example of 
endowment-based, or luck-based, inequality. Note also that this argument does 
not take into account the possibility that some of the existing racial well-being 
gap may be the result of continuing racial discrimination against blacks, also 
an example of bad brute luck. That is, of the portion of the well-being gap not 
attributable to differences in inheritance, some fraction of that is probably 
attributable to ongoing discrimination. 
For all of these reasons, it seems fair to assume that much of the differences 
in social and economic well-being between blacks and whites are attributable 
to luck or endowment, and not to individual choice or ambition, and is thus a 
legitimate target of redistributive policy. Even for those luck egalitarians who 
believe that racial inequality is a product of both luck and choice, the lesson to 
draw from other examples of real world redistribution - such as the income tax 
- is to engage in partial rather than complete equalization, but not to abandon 
the project of distributive justice entirely. Moreover, for egalitarians who are 
skeptical of the luck-choice distinction anyway, and certainly for Rawlsians 
(whose primary concern is inequality with respect to social primary goods), the 
extent of racial inequality that still exists in the United States has to be one of 
the most pressing domestic concerns of our t ime. 
III. REDISTRIBUTING BY RACE 
That persistent racial inequality is a distributive justice concern is not a 
surprising claim. Neither is the suggestion that there should be some measure 
of redistribution to reduce the race gap. Arguments based on theories of 
egalitarian distributive justice have long been used to justify various race­
based preferences, such as affirmative-action programs in college and 
university admissions, as well as federal spending programs that are not 
explicitly targeted at blacks but that disproportionately benefit them, such as 
Head Start.116 Even the civil rights legislation of the 1960s could be defended 
on egalitarian grounds.117 What I want to emphasize in this Part is that race 
has certain properties that make it a particularly useful redistributive tool, 
1 1 6 See, e.g. , Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with 
Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L.  REv. 1439, 147 1 (200 1 )  (discussing egalitarian 
distributive j ustice ethos in connection with genetic discrimination and emphasizing the fact 
that egalitarianism has been used to justify a range of policy responses, from prohibitions on 
discrimination to affirmative action). 
1 1 7 See Michael W. Combs and Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting Brown v. Board of 
Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspective, 47 How. L.J. 627, 65 1 
(referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the triumph of egalitarianism). 
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properties that have been ignored in the slavery reparations debate (perhaps 
because the discussion has focused on the corrective justice perspective) and 
that have been lost in the larger debate over racial equality. As will ·be 
discussed more fully below, race also has some obvious properties that counsel 
against its use, or at least its explicit use, as a redistributive proxy. The 
properties that make race a surprisingly useful redistributive tool are as 
follows: 
(a) race correlates with well-being (the evidence for which I summarized 
above); 
(b) race is relatively immutable (at least for those whose physical 
characteristics make it difficult to "pass" as being of another race); and 
(c) race is relatively observable (although this is less true than one might 
initially think). 
In the remainder of this Part, although I do not argue for a particular type or 
amount of racial redistribution, I do discuss some of the design issues that 
should be taken into account in designing a regime of racial redistribution. But 
first it is necessary to take a brief detour into how redistributive policy works 
in practice. 
A. Redistribution in the Real World: Searching for Reliable, Observable, 
Non-distorting Proxies 
Any real-world redistributive program must find some way, other than direct 
observation, to measure differences in relative well-being in order to determine 
how to allocate public burdens and benefits. This is because, of course, well­
being is not directly observable. For good or ill, human beings do not come 
equipped with digital well-being meters embedded in their foreheads. For that 
reason, all real-world redistributive programs operate on the basis of outward 
indicia or proxies that are believed to correlate with well-being and that are 
relatively observable. Income, for example, is a proxy for well-being that is 
commonly used in redistributive programs, because it is both correlated with 
well-being and observable. That income correlates with well-being is obvious: 
the more money a person has, the broader will be her array of life choices with 
respect to food, clothing, shelter, education, healthcare, and so on.118 
Moreover, although a person's income is doubtless a blend of luck and 
choice, inheritance and hard work, it is possible to draw some luck-choice 
distinctions within the definition of income.119 There is also an obvious sense 
1 1 8 Although money may not be able to buy true happiness, studies have shown income 
to be positively correlated with higher subjective assessments of well-being. See, e.g. , Ed 
Diener & Shigehiro Oishi, Money and Happiness: Income and Subjective Well-Being Across 
Nations, in CULTURE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 208 (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh eds., 
2000) (concluding that wealth within nations correlates with subjective well-being). 
1 1 9 For example, see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text discussing the tax code's 
treatment of cosmetic surgery. 
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in which income is observable. Each line on the Form 1040 corresponds to 
something that can be observed in the world - salaries, wages, dividends, 
interest, capital gains, and so on. Moreover, the observability of these items is 
greatly enhanced in the U.S. and in other developed economies systems of 
information returns under which entities, such as corporate employers and 
financial institutions, are required to report salary, dividends, interest, and the 
like directly to the taxing authority. In sum, income is a reasonably good 
proxy for well-being, and one that is relatively capable of being observed or 
measured. 
All of this is not to say, however, that income is perfect on either dimension 
- correlation with well-being or observability. As already noted, although the 
tax laws attempt to define income to correlate precisely with individual well­
being, and even sometimes draw distinctions along luck-choice lines, much 
inaccuracy and imprecision in the definition and measurement of income 
remain. Some of this inaccuracy and imprecision is intended by Congress. For 
example, Congress sometimes, for reasons of social policy, adopts tax 
expenditure provisions that create exclusions for certain types of receipts that 
undeniably improve well-being.120 And some of the inaccuracy and 
imprecision is unavoidable, precisely because income is not costlessly 
observable .  For example, although there is a surprisingly high degree of tax 
compliance, there is still much noncompliance, even in the U.S. Rich 
taxpayers, with the help of well-paid tax advisors, are often able to shelter 
income through complex and sometimes illegal or borderline legal 
transactions. Self-employed individuals, too, have their own ways of 
appearing poor to the tax collector, especially if their business is conducted 
primarily in cash. The point of all this is not that the income tax is a failed 
system. For the most part, it works reasonably well. Rather, the point is that 
even the best redistributive regime will have some degree of inaccuracy and 
imprecision. 
Another problem with income as a proxy for well-being is that income is not 
immutable, but is a positive function of work effort. Thus, taxing income 
distorts individuals ' decisions regarding whether and how much to work. 
More precisely, to use the jargon of public finance economics, introducing an 
income tax changes the relative price between work and leisure, causing a 
"substitution effect," which means that individuals, when faced with an income 
tax, choose to work less and enjoy leisure more than they would in the absence 
of such a tax. This work-leisure distortion reduces overall social welfare. 121 
Thus, there is an inherent tension: The more redistributive policymakers try to 
make the redistributive program, that is, the more evenly they try to slice the 
1 20 An example of this is the exclusion for certain employee benefits, the largest of which 
is employer-provided health insurance, benefits that clearly increase individual employees' 
well-being but that are allowed to go unreported as income. See I.R.C. § 1 06(A) (exempting 
employer-provided health coverage from an employee' s  gross income). 
1 2 1 See ROSEN, supra note 78, at 36 (discussing the substitution effect of taxation). 
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social pie, the more distorting the system becomes - i.e. the more the pie 
shrinks in size. 
This tension - the efficiency-fairness tradeoff - is impossible for a tax-and­
transfer regime to avoid entirely. On the one hand, when policymakers try to 
make the system more progressive or more distributively just, they end up 
sacrificing efficiency. That is what happens, for example, when marginal tax 
rates are increased on the highest levels of income, or when special deductions 
are phased out as income rises. On the other hand, when policymakers try to 
improve the efficiency of a tax, it is often at the expense of distributive justice. 
The paradigmatic example of the efficient but distributively unjust tax is the 
head tax, a type of lump-sum tax that imposes the same tax liability on every 
individual in the society. Such a tax is perfectly efficient, in the sense that it 
produces no substitution effect (after all, there is no way to avoid the tax other 
than to leave the country), but it is obviously unjust, as the poorest person in 
society pays the same tax as the richest person. This injustice, in fact, is why 
we use an income tax rather than a head tax, because the income tax, for all its 
flaws, at least allows us to allocate tax burdens roughly on the basis of relative 
well-being. 
In sum, real-world redistributive programs must find reliable proxies for 
well-being that are relatively observable. Such redistributive regimes typically 
have a serious problem with distorting work incentives, because most good 
proxies for well-being are functions of work effort; therefore, it is generally 
understood that tradeoffs or compromises must be made between distributive 
justice concerns and efficiency concerns. These are practical facts about 
redistributive programs that must be taken into account, and alternative 
systems of redistribution must be compared with one another in terms of how 
well they deal with these issues. 
B. Race as a Redistributive Proxy: The African American Tax Credit (and 
other design alternatives) 
Now let us return to the three properties of race that make it a potentially 
useful redistributive tool: correlation, observability, and immutability. First, 
race correlates strongly with overall well-being.122 In study after study, and in 
decades of Census surveys, differences in race correlate remarkably well with 
differences in every conceivable measure of human well-being, for adults and 
especially for children. This fact alone is sufficient to justify including race, 
along with income and wealth, in the policymaker's redistributive toolbox and 
thus is sufficient to justify some degree of racial redistribution. 123 
Second, race is relatively observable. Researchers frequently ask people to 
designate their race on Census surveys and other forms, and the answers are 
generally considered reliable indicators of race. Individuals know what their 
122 See supra Part II.C. 
123 Whether it justifies more than the current level of racial redistribution is another 
question to which I return briefly later in this Part. 
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race is, and they generally answer truthfully when asked about it. Moreover, 
according to social science research on the question of defining race, it turns 
out that external observers also are able to identify someone else's race with a 
high degree of accuracy, at least in cases in which that "someone else" is, by 
their own self-designations, either black or white - and not, for example, of 
mixed race.124 
Third, redistributive transfers made purely on the basis of race would not 
distort work incentives, because race, unlike income or wealth, is immutable, 
or at least relatively so, and therefore - unlike income or wealth - is not a 
function of how many hours a person works or in what job. Thus, racial 
redistribution has the quality of a distributively just lump-sum, that is, 
efficient, transfer. The transfer could even be means-tested - for example, 
made available only to blacks below a certain income threshold - without 
losing its lump-sum quality, so long as the racial transfer was in fact set up, 
and could credibly be characterized as, a one-shot deal. If, however, the 
program were designed to provide recurring transfers to African Americans on 
an annual basis (for example, through a special African American tax 
deduction or refundable credit, along the lines of the earned income tax credit), 
such transfers could also be means-tested based on annual income. But that 
sort of annual means-testing, by making the payments a function of individual 
taxpayer's annual income, would reintroduce the work-leisure distortion. Of 
course, that tradeoff between fairness and efficiency might well be appropriate 
and certainly is nothing new in the design of a tax system. 125 
Assuming we have decided that some degree of racial redistribution makes 
sense, the big questions then become: (a) how much redistribution is 
124 Recent research on the question of defining race through self-identification versus 
external observation suggests (unsurprisingly) that there are sometimes discrepancies 
between self-reported and observed race; and in the case of Asian and Latino individuals, 
for example, the discrepancy between the race they designate for themselves and the ones 
that external observers designate can be substantial, with as much as fifty and sixty percent 
of the observers getting it "wrong." DA YID R. HARRIS, IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: 
OBSERVED RACE AND OBSERVER CHARACTERISTICS I 0 tbl.4a (Population Studies Ctr. at the 
Univ. of Michigan, Research Report No. 02-522, 2002), available at 
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/papers/rr02-522.pdf (last accessed Sept. 8, 2004). 
Moreover, with respect to self-reported mixed-race individuals, if we assume again that self­
identification is the best indicator, almost none of the external observers got it right. What 
is interesting for present purposes, however, is that with respect to those individuals who 
self-report as black or white alone (and not as belonging to a mixed-race category), the 
"accuracy" of the external observers - or the correlation between their observations and the 
subjects' self-reported designation -- was extremely high, usually above ninety percent. Id. 
125 For example, the federal income tax system phases out certain deductions and credits 
as income rises in order to limit the benefit of those deductions and credits to individuals 
below a given threshold of income. See, e.g. , l.R.C. § 22(d) (reducing by one half the tax 
credit an elderly or disabled person is eligible for based on income in excess of the threshold 
level). Such phases increase the distortive effect of the system in just the same way that an 
increase in marginal tax rates does. 
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appropriate; and (b) how exactly such a regime should be designed. As to the 
first question, again, I will not even hazard a guess. As to the second question, 
a full answer is beyond the scope of this Article, but I will suggest a few 
policy-design issues that should be taken into account. For starters, putting to 
one side all political, symbolic, and expressive concerns, there is a 
comparative-advantage argument for doing racial redistribution through the 
tax-and-transfer system, perhaps through the federal income tax system, rather 
than through the legal system, such as through lawsuits brought by African 
Americans against various corporations. The argument at this point should be 
fairly obvious: If the goal is to achieve racial distributive justice, rather than 
corrective justice, then a class-action slavery-reparations lawsuit is clearly not 
the best approach. 
Using the legal system would present huge problems of inaccuracy and 
imprecision. For example, in defining the plaintiff class or the beneficiaries of 
the transfers, it would be impossible as a practical matter to include all African 
Americans. The court system simply is not set up to handle that sort of 
massive redistributive program. The federal tax system, by contrast, with its 
large administrative apparatus, is designed to handle this sort of large-scale 
redistribution. And the tax-and-transfer approach, in contrast with the legal 
approach, could be more comprehensive on the payer side as well; that is, not 
only could transfers be made to all blacks, but the tax burden could be imposed 
on all whites or all taxpayers. Furthermore, because the federal income tax 
system already is gathering information about individuals' income, it would be 
relatively simple to means-test a race-based transfer administered through that 
system. For example, an African American tax deduction or credit could 
easily be phased out as income rises above certain thresholds, just as is 
currently done with the earned income tax credit, 126 the personal exemption 
deduction,127 the special deduction for the blind,128 and the special credits for 
the elderly, 129 and those who are retired on disability.130 By contrast, it is not 
clear how means-testing a judicial remedy would work, and, in any event, there 
is no reason to expect that judges or the court system would be as good at that 
sort of calculation as the Treasury Department, the IRS, and the tax system are. 
There are some obvious disadvantages, of course, to using the federal tax 
system to implement cash-based racial redistribution. For one thing, it could 
be argued that race is not so observable after all, or perhaps that it is not 
immutable. That is to say, if an African American tax credit were adopted, 
how can we be sure that individuals who self-identify as black on their tax 
126 I.R.C. § 32 (2000) (allowing for the earned income tax credit). 
127 Id. § 1 5 1  (allowing deductions for personal exemptions). 
1 28 Id. § 63(f)(2) (allowing deductions for both blind individuals and their spouses). 
129 Id. §§ 22, 63(f) (allowing deductions for individuals over 65 years old but reducing 
the credit for the elderly as adjusted gross income exceeds certain levels). 
130 Id. § 22 (reducing the credit, however, as the taxpayer's Adjusted Gross Income 
exceeds certain threshold levels). 
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returns are not lying in order to get the credit? Although it might be reasonable 
to assume that people will answer truthfully about their race in a survey for 
social scientific research, such an assumption is more dangerous when money 
is at stake. Moreover, the problem increases as the comprehensiveness of the 
program increases : the more people that apply for the African American tax 
credit, the harder it becomes for the taxing authority to monitor the veracity of 
each application, and the more tempting it becomes for whites to apply as well. 
This problem is made worse by the fact that race does not have a universally 
agreed upon definition; thus, it is not clear what standard would be used to 
determine whether a taxpayer was answering truthfully or not. According to 
the modern view of race, the concept of race is socially constructed, albeit one 
that depends importantly on certain unchangeable and observable physical 
characteristics, such as skin color, facial features, hair texture, and the like. 1 31 
Thus, there is inevitably a subjective component to defining race, which makes 
the observability of race more difficult than, say, blindness or old age, both of 
which are characteristics that can make one eligible for a tax deduction or 
credit, but both of which are relatively objectively defined and relatively easily 
verified.132 
Perhaps one way to answer the question of observability is to consider 
examples of existing race-based redistributive programs that rely on individual 
applicants to self-designate their race. The most obvious example would be 
1 3 1  The following extended quotation from a recent study on race captures the current 
thinking on what the social category "race" means: 
In virtually all human societies, people take note of and assign significance to the 
physical characteristics of others, such as skin color, hair texture, and distinctive 
features. Race becomes socially significant when members of a society routinely 
divide people into groups based on the possession of these characteristics. These 
characteristics become socially significant when members of a society routinely use 
them to establish racial categories into which people are classified on the basis of their 
own or their ancestors' physical characteristics and when, in turn, these categorizations 
elicit differing social perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors toward each group. 
PANEL ON METHODS FOR ASSESSING DISCRIMINATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 26 (Rebecca M. Blank et al. eds., 2004) (discussing 
the social construction of race); see also Neil J. Smelser et al., Introduction to 1 AMERICA 
BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 1 ,  2-3 (Neil J. Smelser et al. eds., 
200 1 )  (discussing how race, although a social construction, is still "real" and has real 
consequences). 
132 Age is defined, obviously, with reference to the taxpayer's date of birth and can be 
verified by a birth certificate. Blindness is defined in the Code either as "total blindness" 
(presumably, the complete inability to see) or "partial blindness," which means that the 
taxpayer cannot see better than 20/200 in her better eye with glasses or contact lenses, or has 
a field of vision of not more than 20 degrees. I.R.C. § 63(f)(4) (2000). The Treasury 
Regulations governing the blindness deduction call for a doctor's verification of partial 
blindness. Treas. Reg. § 1 . 1 5 1 - l(d) (2004). It is interesting to note that if the taxpayer 
claims to be totally blind, she need only attach a document stating as much. However, if she 
claims to be partially blind, she must get a reference from a qualified doctor. Id. 
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affirmative action programs, such as the ones many colleges and universities 
use in making admissions and financial aid decisions. How do those 
institutions deal with the problem of defining race? The answer is, again, self­
identification. Applicants for admission and for financial aid are asked to 
report their race. The interesting question is what the admissions and financial 
aid offices do to police the accuracy of these racial self-designations. And the 
answer seems to be, for the most part, nothing. At the University of Michigan, 
for example, in both the Law School and undergraduate admissions offices, 
they do not attempt, and as far as I can determine have never attempted, in any 
systematic way to determine the extent to which applicants misidentify their 
race on their application materials.133 This is not to say that, if someone in the 
admissions office happened to discover that an individual applicant blatantly 
lied about his race on his college or law school application, nothing would be 
done about it. It is conceivable that disciplinary proceedings might be brought, 
and the student might be subject to some sanction, perhaps including expulsion 
from the program. But at Michigan at least, there is no systematic ex post 
policing or auditing of individual applicants' racial self-designations. I am not 
aware of any other university or college that handles this issue any differently, 
and, as best I can tell, there is no research on the issue. 
Despite this lack of systematic enforcement or monitoring, it is my 
perception (and the perception of the few colleagues I polled on the question) 
that there is not a widespread problem of rampant lying about one's race on 
law school or undergraduate applications, although, obviously, given the lack 
of hard data on the question, that intuition could just be wishful thinking. Still, 
there are reasons we might expect there to be relatively little cheating with 
respect to racial self-identification in the affirmative-action context. For 
example, the temptation to misreport one's race is probably relatively low in 
part because the precise amount of the subsidy - the degree of advantage in 
admissions - associated with minority status is: (a) relatively small; (b) 
difficult to compute; and ( c ), except in the case of programs that become the 
subject of litigation, 134 kept confidential. Moreover, perhaps most applicants 
wrongly assume that some sort of systematic check will be done by the 
university to assure the accuracy of their racial self-designations, or that they 
might be found out in some way, and the magnitude of the potential 
punishment might make the gamble not worth the risk. In any event, even if 
there is relatively little cheating in the affirmative-action context, it would 
likely be a different matter in the case of a sizeable, easily quantifiable, and 
highly publicized racial cash-subsidy program. 
1 33 For the Supreme Court's recent discussion of the University of Michigan's 
affirmative action programs, see Grutter v .  Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 3 12 (2003) (upholding 
the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program), and Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan's 
undergraduate affirmative action program). 
1 34 See generally Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309 (addressing the use of 
racial preferences in university admissions). 
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In theory, there are steps that might be taken to deal with this potential 
problem in the context of an African American tax credit (or any other form of 
direct cash transfer to African Americans). If we follow the tax analogy to its 
logical (and admittedly farfetched) conclusion, we might imagine 
policymakers setting up an enforcement apparatus that would be similar to 
what is currently done with income tax returns. The process would begin with 
individual taxpayer self-reporting his race on his tax return. But that would not 
be the end of it. We might imagine also that employers would be asked to file 
a special information return for each employee that would identify the racial 
classification of the individual in question, based on the employer's objective 
assessment. The IRS could then match these information returns up with the 
employee tax returns, as they do now with W-2 forms; and discrepancies 
between the tax returns and the information returns would "raise a red flag," 
suggesting grounds for an audit. 
In such an audit, the IRS agent would simply make his own assessment of 
whether the person is black or not. As always, the self-employed would 
present special problems. Given the findings that objective external observers 
tend to be able to identify who is black and who is white (or who self-identifies 
as black or white), 135  the decisions of auditors on this question could be 
considered presumptively valid; and it would then be the taxpayer's job to 
prove she is in fact black to be eligible for the credit. Appeals could then be 
taken to a panel of experts (or maybe a panel of lay people) whose job would 
be simply to give their objective assessments of an audited individual's race. 
If the panel says an individual taxpayer is not black, then, for tax purposes, that 
would be that, and the taxpayer would lose the credit and have to pay the 
relevant penalty and so on. Presumably, the existence of this whole reporting, 
audit, appeal, and punishment process would deter most cheating. 
Such "racial audits" are almost certainly never going to happen in this 
country. They are a political and perhaps a constitutional impossibility. But 
they are an interesting thought experiment, if only because they illustrate one 
of the most serious difficulties with a problem of explicit race-based cash 
transfers. This is not to say, however, that direct cash transfers would have no 
advantages. The analysis above demonstrates otherwise. 
A cash transfer, especially if administered through the federal tax laws, 
would have the benefits of not only being distributively just, but also being 
flexible (i.e., it could be set at any amount), comprehensive and precise (i.e., it 
could be targeted either to all African American taxpayers or to all low-income 
African Americans or to whichever subset of African Americans was deemed 
appropriate); and the transfers could be progressively administered through the 
income tax. On the negative side, such a program may run afoul of the 
Supreme Court's current interpretation of the equal protection clause, given 
135 See HARRIS, supra note 1 24, at 1 0  tbl.4a (listing the results of a study where 
participants were shown photographs of different racial and mixed-racial individuals and 
asked to identify the race of the pictured person). 
2004] REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: KYLE D. LOGUE 1 363 
that the Court has struck down government programs designed to respond 
generally to "societal discrimination" and has upheld only government 
programs that respond to identified discrimination within the government's 
jurisdiction.136 But how the Court would handle a broad-based cash transfer to 
blacks out of general tax dollars enacted at the federal level is still not clear. 
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue in their recent article on slavery 
reparations that such a program may stand a chance of surviving strict scrutiny, 
given that the Court has not yet struck down a piece of federal legislation of 
this sort, and given that the structure of the program under consideration avoids 
the primary concerns that underlie the equal-protection process-based 
analysis.137 That is to say, given how much public attention would be focused 
on the adoption of an explicitly race-based transfer program, Posner and 
Vermeule conclude that "courts should have confidence that any nationally 
enacted reparations scheme represents a product of successful public 
deliberation, or at least of a well functioning pluralist market in legislation, 
rather than a socially suspect interest group transfer."138 Thus, although an 
African American tax credit is probably politically implausible (in fact, 
precisely because it is), it might be constitutional.139 This argument, of course, 
ignores expressive-harm concerns, and some will argue that the expressive 
harm associated with such a program of cash transfers would be prohibitive.140 
Before turning to that question, however, consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of several non-cash, or in-kind, alternatives to an explicit race-
1 36 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1 8, at 7 1 8  (discussing the Supreme Court's 
distinction between identified and societal discrimination). 
1 37 Id. at 7 1 5-2 1 (discussing why cash transfers to blacks levied through the federal 
income tax system might survive current Supreme Court equal protection analysis and 
comparing race-based reparations schemes to current Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding affirmative action). Posner and Vermeule here rely on David Strauss's theory of 
the purpose underlying distinction the Court has drawn among government programs 
designed to remedy specific acts of discrimination and those designed to remedy societal 
discrimination generally. See David A. Strauss, Af irmative Action and the Public Interest, 
1 995 SUP. CT. REv. 1 ,  27-3 1 (arguing that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area 
can best be understood as attempting to prevent interest groups from securing legislation or 
regulations that enrich them at the expense of the public good). 
1 38 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1 8, at 7 19  (concluding that courts need to be 
confident that a nationally enacted reparations scheme is the product of successful public 
deliberation or a functioning pluralist market in legislation, rather than a socially suspect 
interest group transfer). 
139 Note, however, that Posner and Vermeule were discussing a broad-based cash transfer 
program to African Americans that was "justified as recompense for slavery and its 
continuing effects." Id. at 7 1 5. And my justification for the program has had a different 
emphasis - one that relies on principles of distributive rather than corrective justice. 
However, it is certainly consistent with, and indeed a part of, my argument that the 
inequalities between blacks and whites today generally are attributable to the effects of 
slavery, segregation, and discrimination. 
140 I consider that question in infra Part III.D. 
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based cash transfer program of the sort described above. 
C. Alternatives to Direct Cash Transfers 
One approach to racial redistribution that avoids the problem of having to 
adopt procedures for verifying the race of the beneficiaries - and an approach 
that may respond to expressive-harm and constitutional concerns (although not 
necessarily) - would be to target a group in which blacks happen to be 
disproportionately represented: in other words, facially race-neutral tax or 
expenditure programs that have disparate beneficial impact on African 
Americans. An obvious example of this would be simply to redistribute on the 
basis of income or wealth. Because blacks are disproportionately represented 
among those with low incomes, and whites among those with high incomes, 
increasing the progressivity of the federal income tax system would have the 
effect of redistributing from whites to blacks - without having to rely on 
individuals' self-identification of their race. This could be done, for example, 
by raising marginal tax rates on the highest-earning individuals or increasing 
the ceiling on (and the amount of) the earned income tax credit; there would 
obviously be no constitutional obstacle. There are, however, some apparent 
downsides to increased income-tax progressivity. For one thing, ignoring race 
and focusing exclusively on income would continue the existing imprecision in 
the current redistributive program in the sense that middle- and high-income 
blacks, in some ways, are on average less well off than their white counterparts 
with equal income. Again, that is the whole point of redistributing on the basis 
of race as well as income. Second, increasing marginal tax rates would 
increase the distortion of work incentives inherent in any income-based 
redistributive program. 
Perhaps a better approach from an efficiency perspective would be a one­
time lump-sum wealth transfer from the rich to the poor, irrespective of race. 
Given the enormous disparity in wealth between blacks and whites, such a 
transfer would obviously disproportionately benefit African Americans. 
Moreover, if we believe the studies showing that, when household wealth is 
held equal, most of the differences in well-being between blacks and whites 
disappear, then a significant reduction in household wealth disparity would put 
a dent in the racial well-being gap.141 The costs of a program of general wealth 
redistribution are well known. Some argue that wealth is not as observable as 
income, because of valuation problems.142 Also, if the government cannot 
promise credibly that the wealth transfer would be a one-shot deal, the effect 
on work incentives could be devastating. 
In addition, with respect to both ideas - the wealth transfer and the increase 
in income tax rates - there would be problems of compliance of the sort 
141 See supra note 1 14 and accompanying text. 
142 See, e.g. , Yariv Brauner, A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One? Preferential Tax 
Treatment for Reorganizations, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1 ,  9 (noting that some forms of wealth 
are difficult to value given traditional market volatility). 
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discussed above, as individuals would have an increased incentive to 
understate their wealth and income.143 My point here is not to suggest that 
income or wealth redistribution is bad. To the contrary, there is a case to be 
made for redistributing to reduce income and wealth inequality irrespective of 
racial issues, precisely because income and wealth correlate with well-being 
and are relatively observable. Again, that is presumably one of the reasons that 
we currently have a progressive income tax (and a social insurance program). 
The question here is whether to supplement income or wealth redistribution 
with some measure of racial redistribution as well, and that is the issue I have 
been addressing. 
Another facially race-neutral alternative to explicit racial redistribution 
would be federal spending on projects in geographical areas where African 
Americans are over-represented. Racially segregated housing patterns remain 
a reality within cities, where blacks and whites tend to live in relatively 
homogeneous enclaves, 144 as well as among cities, as some cities have more 
blacks, or a higher percentage of blacks, than do others.1 45 Likewise, blacks 
are disproportionately represented within city centers (the so-called inner 
cities), whereas whites predominate in suburban and rural areas.146 Thus, 
government spending programs - on education, housing, jobs, or healthcare -
in predominantly black neighborhoods or predominantly black cities or in the 
inner-city generally, which are funded by broad-based tax revenues, would 
tend to have a racially redistributive effect. 
Moreover, such indirect racial redistribution would have the same lump-sum 
quality as the direct racial cash transfers, as geography-based transfers are also 
not a function of work effort. · In addition, geography-based transfers may 
reduce the problem of individual misrepresentation of race. When individuals 
fill out the census surveys, the data which would be used in making 
geography-based transfers, there is relatively little incentive for them to falsify 
their race. In a sense, geography-based transfers would exploit a sort of 
143 An obvious alternative to using cash transfers from rich to poor (or from high-income 
to low-income) would be to make the transfers in-kind: that is, to increase federal spending 
programs that benefit poor and low income households. Whether cash transfer or in-kind 
transfers are better is an issue that has received considerable attention in the public finance 
literature, and I will largely ignore it here, except insofar as I discuss anti-discrimination law 
as a form of in-kind transfer. 
144 See Victor A. Bolden, Where Does New York City Go From Here: Chaos or 
Community?, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 103 1 ,  1 04 1  (referring to the "hypersegregat[ion]" of 
sixteen large American cities). 
145 See JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000, at 1 7  (2001 ), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/resseg/pdf/paa_paper.pdf (last accessed Sept. 8, 
2004); JESSE McKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, at 7 (2001 ). 
146 JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: MARCH 2002, at 2 fig.2 (2003), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-54 1 .pdf (last accessed Sept. 8, 2004). 
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collective action problem: although it would be in the collective interest of the 
respondents to falsify their race (and increase the chances of their region 
getting a transfer or the size of their transfer), there would be little individual 
incentive to do so, as the benefit to each person would be trivial.147 There 
might also be an increased incentive for whites to move into areas that were 
receiving geography-based subsidies, and this could be seen as a type of 
distortion; however, this could also be seen as a side benefit of the regime: 
increased residential integration. 
The disadvantages of the geography-as-proxy-for-race approach are not 
difficult to identify, however. Geographically targeted subsidies can never be 
as precise or as comprehensive as direct transfers based on individual tax 
returns can be. Predominantly black areas will almost always have some white 
residents, and likewise there are some blacks in predominantly white areas. 
Moreover, some of the poorest and generally least well off areas of the country 
are in rural settings, where blacks tend to be underrepresented.148 And 
although means-testing geographically targeted transfers would be possible, it 
would not be easy - certainly not as easy as means-testing direct cash transfers 
administered through the tax system. Furthermore, if it were possible to make 
the targeting of geographic transfers very precise (so as to resemble the fine­
tuning possible in a tax ·system), presumably whatever constitutional, political, 
and expressive objections that can be raised against the cash transfers would 
apply to the geographic transfers as well. 
Another alternative to direct cash transfers from whites to blacks has 
received relatively little attention as a system of redistribution, although that is 
clearly what it is. This is the collection of laws forbidding statistical 
discrimination against African Americans in various contexts. By "statistical 
discrimination" I mean discrimination that is based neither on racial animus 
nor on erroneous stereotypes. Rather, statistical discrimination, as I use the 
term, means discrimination that is based on accurate assessments of the 
statistical characteristics of African Americans as a group. Statistical racial 
discrimination occurs when, for example, insurance companies charged black 
policy holders higher premiums than they charge white policy holders, because 
blacks in fact present on average statistically higher insurance costs. Or if 
banks charged blacks higher interest rates for loans, all else equal, because in 
fact blacks presented a higher default risk, that too would be statistical 
discrimination. 
Such discrimination, it turns out, is generally forbidden by law.149 In the 
147 Of course, state or local government officials might have an incentive to overcome 
this collective action problem to increase federal dollars spent in their area, but presumably 
that sort of organized fraud would be minimal. 
1 48 See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Politics of the Rural Vote, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 743, 755-57 
(2003) (observing that of the 250 poorest counties in America, 244 are rural). 
149 Of course, antidiscrimination laws do not focus solely only on statistical 
discrimination; rather, they generally forbid all discrimination on the basis of race in certain 
2004] REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: KYLE D. LOGUE 1367 
case of insurance, it is generally state insurance laws that prohibit insurers 
from explicitly using race in the process of insurance underwriting.150 Thus, 
with respect to all types of insurance (life, health, auto, and homeowners), 
insurance companies may not take race explicitly into account when deciding 
whether to provide a given individual insurance coverage, how much coverage 
to provide, or how much to charge for that coverage. Federal law forbids 
lending institutions from taking race into account even if race in fact correlates 
with higher lending costs, although the source of law is primarily federal 
statutes rather than state law.151 And again, the prohibitions on the use of race 
here apply even though blacks may present higher costs to the insurer or the 
lender than do whites on average. What is interesting about the prohibition 
against statistical discrimination in particular, however, is that it can be 
justified as a form of real-world redistribution - as a system of transfers from 
the better off to the less well off.152 Although it can be argued that anti­
discrimination law is not the best system of redistribution - neither the most 
efficient nor the most comprehensive or the most precise - it has some 
advantages. 
My point can be illustrated through an example involving insurance, 
although the analysis would apply to loan markets and other contexts as well. 
Imagine there is an insurance pool in which there are one hundred total policy 
holders, eighty-eight of whom are white and twelve of whom are black; and 
assume that they are all purchasing essentially the same policy from the same 
insurer. Imagine also that the insurance fully covers the risk in question, such 
that an insured, having bought insurance, will be indifferent as to whether the 
setting (such as in the formation of contracts or the sale or purchase of property), and 
sometimes statistical discrimination gets included in that prohibition. See 42 U.S.C. §§  
1 98 1 -83 (2000). 
150 This legal prohibition can take a number of forms. Many states statutorily and 
explicitly forbid the explicit use of race in insurance underwriting. Other states prohibit 
unfair trade practice or unfair discrimination generally, which are then interpreted by colirts 
to include discrimination on the basis of race. See, e.g. , ALA. CODE § 27- 12-1 1 ( 1 986 & 
Supp. 2003) (banning racial discrimination in the sale of insurance); CAL. INS. CODE § 
1 0 140 (West 1 993 & Supp. 2004) (banning racial discrimination in the sale of insurance). 
15 1 See, e.g. , Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 69 1  (2000). Federal Reserve 
Board Regulation B implements this act and prohibits discrimination in all credit markets. 
See Regulation B (Equal Credit Opportunity), 1 2  C.F.R. § 202 (2004). 
152 Laws forbidding animus-based and error-based discrimination also produce a form of 
redistribution, of course. However, the prohibition of those types of discrimination can also 
be justified on grounds other than distributive justice. For example, rules against animus­
based ·discrimination might best be explained on corrective justice grounds, and rules 
against error-based discrimination on standard consumer protection grounds. What is 
interesting about the prohibition on statistical discrimination is that it is less easy to square 
with either of these theories. Corrective justice does not apply, because the party doing the 
discriminating is not the cause of the statistical differences in costs represented by blacks as 
a group; and consumer protection does not apply, because we are assuming that the 
statistical association is accurate. 
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loss occurs or not.153 Assume finally that the per-insured actuarially fair 
insurance premium under this policy would be $ 1.00 for whites and $ 1.30 for 
blacks. The reason for this difference in actuarial expected costs, we will 
assume, is that blacks on average, holding all other characteristics equal, 
represent a thirty percent higher risk than do whites for the insurance coverage 
in question. Maybe this is because blacks have a higher incidence of certain 
deadly diseases or tend to live in more dangerous neighborhoods or have a 
greater incidence of poverty or, for whatever reason, have a shorter life 
expectancy - all of which could be relevant statistically for one or another type 
of insurance. Thus, in the absence of a legal prohibition, the insurer in a 
competitive market would likely separate this group into two insurance pools, 
charging blacks $ 1.30 per person and whites $ 1.00 for the same coverage; and 
this result would be considered "actuarially fair," to use the insurance industry 
jargon, as the insurance premium each person pays would represent his or her 
expected insurance costs - based on the best available statistical measures. 
Now consider what happens when the insurer is forbidden from using race 
in determining insurance premiums. Because the total expected cost of the 
pool is $ 103.60, 154 the insurance premium charged to each of the one hundred 
policy holders would be $ 1.036. The result is a full equalization of 
circumstances with respect to the particular risk being insured under the policy 
in question. Why so? Notice that all of the policy holders are paying the same 
premium ($1.036 per person), and all of them are, by assumption, fully insured 
and therefore indifferent to the risk being insured against. In effect, what has 
happened is that the insurance company has taken the extra $3.60 of expected 
insurance costs associated with the twelve black members of the pool and, 
instead of leaving that cost to be borne by the blacks as a group (as 
discriminatory, but actuarially fair insurance would do), it has distributed that 
cost evenly over the entire pool, blacks and whites alike. This outcome, in 
effect, treats the extra thirty cents per person in expected insurance costs of the 
black members of the insurance pool as a burden that society should bear, not 
one that blacks as a group should bear.155 
This sort of redistributive regime, like all the other redistributive options 
discussed above, has advantages and disadvantages. First, on the plus side, if 
we imagine that the extra insurance costs are attributable to bad brute luck on 
the part of the black policy holders (either as a result of the legacy of slavery or 
ongoing discrimination or whatever), such a redistributive transfer makes some 
1 53 This is obviously an unrealistic assumption, but it simplifies the analysis and relaxing 
it does not change the direction of the result. 
1 54 ( 1 .00 x 88) + (l .30 x 12) = 1 03 .6 
155 Note also that this example could be generalized to social insurance as well. That is, 
whenever the government provides insurance coverage for some risk and that risk tends to 
correlate with race, so long as the funding mechanism for the social insurance in question 
does not attempt to allocate the costs among groups on an actuarial basis, there will be racial 
cross-subsidization. 
2004] REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: KYLE D. LOGUE 1369 
sense in terms of luck-based egalitarianism. The transfer is, in effect, 
explicitly race-based and therefore has the lump-sum qualities that have 
already been described with respect to racial transfers generally. 
Second, the anti-discrimination approach avoids the need for a government 
regulator to calculate the amount of the transfer each year. Note that the 
transfer in the example above is equivalent to a tax-and-transfer alternative 
under which the government pays thirty cents to each of the twelve black 
policy holders and then funds it with a special tax of 3.6 cents on all one 
hundred policy holders. The question, though, is how the government would 
determine the amount of the transfer or the tax. It could rely on the insurance 
industry or its own research to provide the relevant actuarial data. But we 
might be skeptical of the government's comparative advantage in this regard. 
By contrast, with the anti-discrimination approach, we are relying on 
competition among insurers (facing the constraint of anti-discrimination law) 
to produce the right result. Moreover, under this approach, the transfer and tax 
would automatically adjust as cost differentials between blacks and whites 
changed over time. Thus, there is no need for "racial audits," as there is no 
need to for this redistributive system to identify who is black and who is white. 
Simply forbidding the use of race - enforcing a norm of color blindness -
automatically produces the desired level of cross-subsidization.156 All of these 
properties, it should be noted, apply to social insurance as well, so long as the 
social insurance regime in question: (a) provides benefits on a color-blind 
basis; and (b) is funded on a color-blind basis as well. Thus, for example, 
Medicare and Medicaid, insofar as they provide equal benefits to whites and 
blacks, and insofar as blacks have higher medical costs, can be understood as 
having a racially redistributive component. 
The disadvantages of anti-discrimination law as redistributive system are 
well known. The rule against racial statistical discrimination in insurance 
underwriting produces racial redistribution with a substantially narrower, or 
less comprehensive, scope than could be accomplished through the tax system. 
The transfers are limited to the parties within a given insurance pool - a group 
of policy holders who are being lumped together by a particular insurer for the 
purpose of calculating prices. So long as we are not talking about a single­
payer insurance system, but rather an insurance system - as in the U.S. - in 
which insurance is provided by hundreds of different insurance companies, 
there are in effect thousands of different insurance pools. Thus, the race-based 
redistribution that is produced from the rule against racial discrimination 
would doubtless be somewhat uneven as compared with explicit raced-based 
redistribution through a national tax-and-transfer system, where redistribution 
can be from all white taxpayers to all black taxpayers within the country. This 
1 56 Of course, if the insurance in question does not fully cover the Joss being insured 
against, as will almost always be the case given the prevalence of deductibles and co­
payment features, the non-discrimination rule will result in transfers that are not fully 
equalizing with respect to the risk in question. 
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critique, however, can be overstated. As insurance and lending pools increase 
in size, and to the extent they .tend to rely on the same data in doing their 
underwriting, the practical difference between redistribution via insurance 
cross-subsidization and redistribution via the tax-and-transfer system 
diminishes. 
A more serious critique of redistribution via anti-discrimination law is akin 
to a critique of redistribution via affirmative-action: the benefits of the transfer 
tend not to go to the African Americans who are the worst off, but rather go to 
the in individuals who are on the margin between getting the benefit without 
the subsidy. Thus, just as affirmative-action in higher education almost by 
definition helps those African American applicants who are on the cusp of 
getting into and affording an elite college or university, cross-subsidization in 
insurance and lending markets will tend to help those African Americans who 
are on the margin between buying and not buying insurance. The worst off 
blacks, the ones who are truly "uninsurable" or who cannot possibly get a loan 
and are thus not even in the market, will not benefit from the non­
discrimination rule. For those people, only direct cash subsidies or in-kind 
subsidies can help. Moreover, the individuals who are funding the cross­
subsidization of insurance and loans for blacks under a non-discrimination 
approach are not only the white policy holders or borrowers who are forced to 
pay the higher, cross-subsidizing prices, but also the relatively less well off 
whites who, under the non-discrimination rule, are priced out of the market.157 
D. Summary, Objections, and Qualifications 
The main point of this Part, and perhaps the most important point in the 
article, is that if some form of racial redistribution is a good idea (because race 
correlates with substantial differences in well-being and is relatively 
observable and immutable), then there are many other program-design issues 
that need to be taken into account. I have only touched on some of those issues 
here. Using the tax system to implement a cash transfer would be the most 
precise (for example, the easiest to means-test) and the most comprehensive 
approach, but would give rise to the problem of identifying which taxpayer is 
of which race - and may run afoul of the Constitution. Various implicit in­
kind alternatives - such as redistributing on the basis of geography and 
subsidizing, for example, inner-city neighborhoods, businesses, and schools -
would be less precise (for example, less easy to means-test) and less 
comprehensive, but would also suffer less from the problem of needing to rely 
on racial self-designation, a problem that seems not to have disabled 
affirmative-action programs but that would likely be much more acute in a 
1 57 This is a well known critique of prohibitions against statistical discrimination. See, 
e.g., Martin J. Katz, Insurance and the Limits of Rational Discrimination, 8 YALE L. & 
PoL'Y REv. 436, 450 ( 1990) (analyzing the effects of banning statistical discrimination and 
recommending a subsidy for minorities rather than an outright ban on statistical 
discrimination). 
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nation-wide program of cash transfers. Anti-discrimination law, in particular, 
the prohibition on statistical racial discrimination, provides an example of an 
existing racially redistributive regime that seems to be relatively 
uncontroversial, is obviously constitutional, and that has some technical 
advantages (such as not requiring the government to engage in racial audits). 
However, anti-discrimination law will be neither as precise nor as 
comprehensive as direct cash transfers and can have distributively unjust 
consequences as well. 
Imagining objections to the whole idea of redistribution by race is not 
difficult. There is the libertarian critique, of course, which would apply to any 
program of redistribution. But even if for those who support, or who are at 
least willing to tolerate, some types of redistribution - such as redistribution to 
reduce income inequality - there are obvious objections to racial redistribution 
per se. For example, many will object to racially redistributive programs that 
are justified on luck-egalitarian grounds rather corrective-justice grounds, 
because such a justification is demeaning or condescending to blacks. The 
argument would be that blacks do not need charity; rather, they need 
compensation for the harm that has been caused to them. 
From the other direction, many will object to the idea of racial redistribution 
simply because they believe that the greater average level of well-being of 
whites as a group is mostly the product of differences in choices that have been 
made, and continue to be made, by whites and blacks. Alternatively, there will 
be some who hold the view that the mere existence of brute-luck-based 
inequality, if that is what it is, does not provide an appropriate basis for 
coercive government transfers.158 These are all legitimate criticisms of the 
position set forth in this Article, and I do not have good responses, at least 
none better than the ones already provided. I would, however, reiterate my 
position that, if we are going to engage in broad-based racially redistributive 
transfers, some version of egalitarian distributive justice (even if one rejects 
the luck/choice distinction) provides a better theoretical framework than does 
the corrective-justice story. As for the complaint that the racial inequalities are 
not luck-based, or not the legitimate target of redistributive policy, I would 
refer back to my previous arguments.159 But my ultimate response is this: All 
of these issues will ultimately be decided through the political process, and 
because the question would necessarily receive a lot of public attention, there 
is a tautological (but, I think, meaningful) sense in which, if the costs 
(including the expressive or symbolic costs) of racial redistribution exceed the 
benefits, then it will not happen. 
It is interesting to note that the expressive or symbolic objections to racial 
redistribution seem to diminish when the transfers are indirect (by geography, 
for example, rather than explicitly by race) or when they are structured as 
automatic cross-subsidization within insurance pools or lending markets. Why 
1 58 One need not, of course, be a libertarian to oppose government redistribution. 
1 59 See supra Part III.C. 
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this is so is difficult to say. Perhaps voters do not understand that these sorts of 
programs implicitly involve racial redistribution. If so, then one function of 
this Article would be to point that fact out, which might mean creating 
controversy where none existed before, which may or may not be a good thing. 
Perhaps, however, people just view implicit transfers differently, as an 
empirical and even normative matter. That is, maybe people fully understand 
the racially redistributive component, for example, in the anti-discrimination 
principle in insurance law (and in the funding mechanisms for social insurance 
as well), but they regard this as an acceptable form of redistribution - more so 
than, say, an African American tax credit, which would tend to place too much 
public emphasis on the well-being gap between whites and blacks. Again, all 
of these issues could be a part of the public debate over whether to have racial 
redistribution, how much, and in what form. 
Another objection to racial redistribution generally is that it would seem to 
apply to groups other than blacks. Native Americans may be the least well off 
group in American society, even less well off along many dimensions than 
African Americans; and this is according to the same studies that reveal the 
black-white well-being gap on which much of my analysis is based. 160 Would 
not all the same arguments support redistributive programs that benefit Native 
Americans? That is certainly possible. The logical conclusion of my argument 
may well apply to Native Americans, and perhaps to Hispanic Americans, who 
also lag behind whites on average in many areas, although I have focused on 
the black-white well-being gap. My point is that, so long as the racial or ethnic 
category (a) is correlated with differences in well-being, (b) is observable, and 
( c) is relatively immutable, it has the properties necessary to make it a 
potentially useful, although possibly politically explosive, redistributive proxy. 
This conclusion obviously highlights the difference between the corrective 
justice approach - which needs to have the link between present harm and past 
wrongful act - and the distributive justice approach - which needs only the 
observation of brute luck inequality. A related complaint would be that, as 
individuals from different races inter-marry and have children, the statistical 
differences among the races will presumably diminish over time, and hence the 
potential value of race as a redistributive proxy will diminish as well. When 
the Census data are taken in future years, in other words, a smaller percentage 
of people will self-designate as all-white or all-black, and the racial categories 
that are used to do the various well-being studies will begin to merge and break 
down. That is certainly possible, perhaps even likely. And if that happens, if 
the current racial categories lose their predictive power with respect to 
different measures of well-being, that would be all the better. Of course, if that 
happens, the need for the racial transfers, again, whether in-kind or in-cash, 
would also diminish. Therefore, one worry is that racially redistributive 
programs, once enacted, will be difficult to eliminate or reduce over time. 
160 See generally CHANGING AMERICA, supra note 89, at 35 ("According to the 1 990 
census, the median family income of American Indians . . .  was lower than that of blacks"). 
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That is a serious concern. 
One response might be to plan periodic reassessments based on future 
Census research into the relative well-being of blacks and whites and other 
racial and ethnic groups, and as the well-being gaps diminish - and race 
becomes less predictive of relative well-being - the programs would be 
reduced. Again, this might be politically difficult, and this is another reason to 
prefer anti-discrimination law as a form of racial redistribution. That is, 
although there are serious disadvantages to the redistribution through 
prohibitions against statistical discrimination, anti-discrimination law does 
have the advantage of automatically adjusting to changes in the relative costs 
associated with being black or white. Thus, if blacks and whites draw closer 
together, for example, in terms of relative health costs, the cross-subsidy 
caused by the prohibition on racial discrimination in insurance underwriting 
would automatically diminish as well. 
Finally, perhaps the strongest counter-argument to my case for some level of 
racial redistribution is this: If there are so many different measures of well­
being with respect to which blacks (and maybe Native Americans and 
Hispanics) lag behind whites, then, instead of relying on a system of racial 
classification, with all of the historical, political, and constitutional baggage it 
entails, why not instead seek to achieve greater equality with respect to each of 
those measures of well-being. In other words, if there is inequality with 
respect to housing opportunities we should have housing subsidies for the poor 
(or those having trouble getting good housing); if there is inequality with 
respect to health care, we should have health-care or health-insurance subsidies 
for the poor and uninsured (or maybe a nationalized system of healthcare); if 
there is educational inequality, we should subsidize education, especially for 
the poor; and if the problem is poverty generally, we should just redistribute to 
reduce poverty, either with direct cash transfers or with subsidies to certain 
types of job-creating industries or in some other way. With this argument I 
have no real disagreement. Indeed, this alternative is probably what I would 
recommend. It may well be that the most efficient, precise, comprehensive, 
administrable, and symbolically acceptable approach to dealing with these 
issues is to have separate redistributive programs for each dimension of well­
being. The advantage of using race as a proxy for all of these things, recall, 
was that it provides a relatively inexpensive (in one sense) way of getting at all 
of these dimensions of well-being in one cash or in-kind transfer and in a 
relatively non-distorting way. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has taken seriously the idea of slavery reparations as a 
redistributive program, and substantial white-to-black redistribution seems to 
be what many advocates of slavery reparations, at the core of their arguments, 
are proposing. The Article, therefore, is both a normative paper, in that it 
offers a defense of a modest version of racial redistribution, and a policy­
design paper, in that it explores the implementation issues that would 
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inevitably arise if we were to pursue various modes of racial redistribution. 
Ultimately whether the sorts of programs I have been discussing, in-kind or in­
cash, would be considered radical or conventional is a question of magnitude. 
A $50 federal tax deduction limited only to African Americans would be 
trivial, although perhaps unconstitutional; whereas a massive increase in 
federal spending on inner-city schools funded by either an increase in the top 
federal income tax rates or by a new federal wealth tax would clearly be 
constitutional, but radical indeed. Precisely how much redistribution by race 
there should be, what forms such redistribution should take, and whether the 
amount of racial redistribution that we are already doing both implicitly 
(through targeted spending programs and prohibitions against statistical 
discrimination) and explicitly (through affirmative-action programs) is enough 
are the difficult questions, and I do not answer them here. I do suggest, 
however, some of the general types of programs that should be considered and 
the criteria for evaluating them. More importantly, I suggest that these are the 
key questions that should be the focus of attention in the slavery reparations 
debate. 
